Efficiency of Competitive Rating Agencies

Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper develops a model of rating migration by the credit rating agencies. We analyse how the rating agencies enhance efficiency. In this framework, we also investigate the possibility of a regulator increasing net surplus by appropriate policies. The firms have private information regarding the default probability of their projects. The investor is rational and has Bayesian beliefs. The rating agency is a profit maximizing intermediary. Effectiveness of some of the regulatory policies are highlighted.
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竞争性评级机构的效率
本文建立了信用评级机构评级迁移模型。我们分析了评级机构如何提高效率。在此框架下,我们还研究了监管者通过适当政策增加净盈余的可能性。这些公司拥有有关其项目违约概率的私人信息。投资者是理性的,有贝叶斯信念。评级机构是利润最大化的中介机构。一些监管政策的有效性得到了强调。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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