Nano-Based Food and Substantial Equivalence: A Category-Mistake
J. Woodrow, M. Mehta
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In this paper, the authors argue that substantial equivalence is an inapt arbiter of equivalence for nano-based food, and that it incorporates a fundamental flaw in logic known as a category-mistake. changes in nutritional composition (Srinivas et al., 2010), or the development of new or altered human allergens (van Putten et al., 2010; Rubial-Mendieta et al., 1997). Collectively, these considerations represent the three main characteristics embedded into a regulatory approach that utilizes a decision-making principle known as substantial equivalence. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE The principle of substantial equivalence first emerged in the 1990s when regulators were given the task of assessing the safety of genetically modified foods in a policy environment where specific biotechnology regulations and DOI: 10.4018/jnmc.2010070103 International Journal of Nanotechnology and Molecular Computation, 2(3), 46-54, July-September 2010 47 Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. dedicated hazard and risk assessment tools had not yet been developed. This policy vacuum was quickly filled with competing ideas on how best to regulate products of biotechnology. At that time a choice existed for treating genetically modified foods similarly to other functional innovations such as novel chemical compounds including pesticides, food additives and pharmaceuticals (Millstone, Brunner & Mayer, 1999). Moreover, evidence-based research could have been developed and deployed to establish acceptable daily intakes (ADIs). Due to a general reluctance on the part of industry to carry out toxicological studies, and also because the very notion of establishing ADIs for genetically modified food implied restricting or limiting consumption, substantial equivalence was eventually adopted and embedded into policy statements of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Substantial equivalence is essentially a comparative approach. It is not a risk assessment but rather a hazard assessment tool for identifying possible problem areas (Kuiper et al., 2002). Hazard assessment involves identifying and controlling hazards, while risk assessment involves calculating the probability of a hazard generating adverse outcomes multiplied by the consequences associated with exposure. Consequently, risk assessment is part of a risk management approach, whereas hazard assessment is simply one of the input variables in the management of risk (Leiss, 2001). Since risk controversies like those seen on the question of nuclear safety (Mehta, 2005) involve contested concepts of risk acceptability, it should be no surprise to discover that public opposition to genetically modified food has focused on the criteria used for approving these products (Levidow, Murphy & Carr, 2007), and on labelling (Dannenberg, 2009). Clearly, several lessons need to be learned from this history when considering the likely trajectory that nanotechnology will follow as its introduction accelerates (Mehta, 2004; Frewer, 2010). Thus, sensitivity to consumer values (Vendermoere et al., 2009), general ethical considerations (Hunt & Mehta, 2006), preferences (Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004), and risk-benefit perceptions must become more central (Siegrist, Stampfli, & Kastenholtz, 2009). Additionally, there are strong arguments asserting that nano-based products represent a special case for application of the precautionary principle as a form of precautionary risk management and regulation (Clift, 2006). Underlying the principle of substantial equivalence is the assumption that a genetically modified food can be deemed substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart if it has the same set of metabolites and similar sequences of amino acids and amides (Baker et al., 2006), falls within a specified range for identified nutritional and anti-nutritional components (Novak and Haslberger, 2000), and if it does not introduce unanticipated human allergens (Martens, 2000). If it passes these three levels of analysis, the food in question is generally regarded as safe and no additional regulatory scrutiny is required. In Canada and the United States this determination excludes the “novel” or genetically modified food from a requirement to label it as well. At the moment, substantial equivalence is the only widely accepted approach for assessing genetically modified food. Sophisticated experiments continue to show that genetically modified foods are quite similar to but not equivalent with their natural counterparts (Catchpole et al., 2005), in spite of the fact that few standardized approaches or statistical techniques are available for comparing across studies or food products. Pusztai and Bardocz (2006) urged caution about nano-based food, and nano-particles in food, and recommended that future research concentrate on nutritional and toxicological testing protocols including functional analyses of the effects of nano-based food on metabolism, organ and tissue development, endocrine functions, and gut flora. That appropriate safety testing is not currently done, according to Pusztai and Bardocz (2006), brings into question the adequacy of regulatory systems and their over-reliance on substantial equivalence. 7 more pages are available in the full version of this document, which may be purchased using the \"Add to Cart\" button on the product's webpage: www.igi-global.com/article/nano-based-food-substantialequivalence/52088?camid=4v1 This title is available in InfoSci-Journals, InfoSci-Journal Disciplines Medicine, Healthcare, and Life Science. Recommend this product to your librarian: www.igi-global.com/e-resources/libraryrecommendation/?id=2","PeriodicalId":259233,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Nanotechnol. Mol. 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引用次数: 5
Abstract
In recent years regulators have become sensitized to the fact that advances in nanotechnology challenge current regulatory approaches and capacities. Since many of these issues parallel earlier debates on genetically modified foods, it seems highly likely that similar decision-making tools and approaches will be used for governing nano-based food. A key decision-making tool used by regulators in North America and Europe involves application of the principle of substantial equivalence. In this paper, the authors argue that substantial equivalence is an inapt arbiter of equivalence for nano-based food, and that it incorporates a fundamental flaw in logic known as a category-mistake. changes in nutritional composition (Srinivas et al., 2010), or the development of new or altered human allergens (van Putten et al., 2010; Rubial-Mendieta et al., 1997). Collectively, these considerations represent the three main characteristics embedded into a regulatory approach that utilizes a decision-making principle known as substantial equivalence. SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE The principle of substantial equivalence first emerged in the 1990s when regulators were given the task of assessing the safety of genetically modified foods in a policy environment where specific biotechnology regulations and DOI: 10.4018/jnmc.2010070103 International Journal of Nanotechnology and Molecular Computation, 2(3), 46-54, July-September 2010 47 Copyright © 2010, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. dedicated hazard and risk assessment tools had not yet been developed. This policy vacuum was quickly filled with competing ideas on how best to regulate products of biotechnology. At that time a choice existed for treating genetically modified foods similarly to other functional innovations such as novel chemical compounds including pesticides, food additives and pharmaceuticals (Millstone, Brunner & Mayer, 1999). Moreover, evidence-based research could have been developed and deployed to establish acceptable daily intakes (ADIs). Due to a general reluctance on the part of industry to carry out toxicological studies, and also because the very notion of establishing ADIs for genetically modified food implied restricting or limiting consumption, substantial equivalence was eventually adopted and embedded into policy statements of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Substantial equivalence is essentially a comparative approach. It is not a risk assessment but rather a hazard assessment tool for identifying possible problem areas (Kuiper et al., 2002). Hazard assessment involves identifying and controlling hazards, while risk assessment involves calculating the probability of a hazard generating adverse outcomes multiplied by the consequences associated with exposure. Consequently, risk assessment is part of a risk management approach, whereas hazard assessment is simply one of the input variables in the management of risk (Leiss, 2001). Since risk controversies like those seen on the question of nuclear safety (Mehta, 2005) involve contested concepts of risk acceptability, it should be no surprise to discover that public opposition to genetically modified food has focused on the criteria used for approving these products (Levidow, Murphy & Carr, 2007), and on labelling (Dannenberg, 2009). Clearly, several lessons need to be learned from this history when considering the likely trajectory that nanotechnology will follow as its introduction accelerates (Mehta, 2004; Frewer, 2010). Thus, sensitivity to consumer values (Vendermoere et al., 2009), general ethical considerations (Hunt & Mehta, 2006), preferences (Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004), and risk-benefit perceptions must become more central (Siegrist, Stampfli, & Kastenholtz, 2009). Additionally, there are strong arguments asserting that nano-based products represent a special case for application of the precautionary principle as a form of precautionary risk management and regulation (Clift, 2006). Underlying the principle of substantial equivalence is the assumption that a genetically modified food can be deemed substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart if it has the same set of metabolites and similar sequences of amino acids and amides (Baker et al., 2006), falls within a specified range for identified nutritional and anti-nutritional components (Novak and Haslberger, 2000), and if it does not introduce unanticipated human allergens (Martens, 2000). If it passes these three levels of analysis, the food in question is generally regarded as safe and no additional regulatory scrutiny is required. In Canada and the United States this determination excludes the “novel” or genetically modified food from a requirement to label it as well. At the moment, substantial equivalence is the only widely accepted approach for assessing genetically modified food. Sophisticated experiments continue to show that genetically modified foods are quite similar to but not equivalent with their natural counterparts (Catchpole et al., 2005), in spite of the fact that few standardized approaches or statistical techniques are available for comparing across studies or food products. Pusztai and Bardocz (2006) urged caution about nano-based food, and nano-particles in food, and recommended that future research concentrate on nutritional and toxicological testing protocols including functional analyses of the effects of nano-based food on metabolism, organ and tissue development, endocrine functions, and gut flora. That appropriate safety testing is not currently done, according to Pusztai and Bardocz (2006), brings into question the adequacy of regulatory systems and their over-reliance on substantial equivalence. 7 more pages are available in the full version of this document, which may be purchased using the "Add to Cart" button on the product's webpage: www.igi-global.com/article/nano-based-food-substantialequivalence/52088?camid=4v1 This title is available in InfoSci-Journals, InfoSci-Journal Disciplines Medicine, Healthcare, and Life Science. Recommend this product to your librarian: www.igi-global.com/e-resources/libraryrecommendation/?id=2
纳米食品和实质等同:一个类别错误
近年来,监管机构已经意识到纳米技术的进步挑战了当前的监管方法和能力。由于许多这些问题与先前关于转基因食品的辩论类似,因此很有可能将类似的决策工具和方法用于管理纳米食品。北美和欧洲监管机构使用的一项关键决策工具涉及实质等同原则的应用。在这篇论文中,作者们认为,对于纳米食品来说,实质等效是一个不恰当的等效仲裁者,它包含了一个被称为类别错误的逻辑基本缺陷。营养成分的变化(Srinivas et al., 2010),或新的或改变的人类过敏原的发展(van Putten et al., 2010;Rubial-Mendieta et al., 1997)。总的来说,这些考虑因素代表了监管方法中嵌入的三个主要特征,该方法利用了被称为实质等效的决策原则。实质对等原则首次出现在20世纪90年代,当时监管机构被赋予在政策环境中评估转基因食品安全性的任务,其中具体的生物技术法规和DOI: 10.4018/jnmc.2010070103国际纳米技术与分子计算学报,2(3),46- 54,2010年7月- 9月47版权所有©2010,IGI Global。未经IGI Global书面许可,禁止以印刷或电子形式复制或分发。专门的危害和风险评估工具尚未开发。这一政策真空很快就被关于如何最好地监管生物技术产品的相互竞争的观点所填补。当时存在一种选择,即处理转基因食品与处理其他功能创新(如杀虫剂、食品添加剂和药品等新型化合物)类似(Millstone, Brunner & Mayer, 1999)。此外,本可以开发和部署基于证据的研究来确定可接受的每日摄入量(adi)。由于工业界普遍不愿进行毒理学研究,也因为为转基因食品建立食品安全评价指标的概念本身就意味着限制或限制消费,因此经济合作与发展组织(经合组织)、联合国粮食及农业组织(粮农组织)和世界卫生组织(世卫组织)最终采用了实质等同标准,并将其纳入政策声明。实质等值本质上是一种比较方法。它不是一种风险评估,而是一种识别可能存在问题区域的危害评估工具(Kuiper et al., 2002)。危害评估涉及识别和控制危害,而风险评估涉及计算危害产生不良后果的概率乘以与暴露有关的后果。因此,风险评估是风险管理方法的一部分,而危害评估只是风险管理中的一个输入变量(Leiss, 2001)。由于在核安全问题上看到的风险争议(Mehta, 2005)涉及有争议的风险可接受性概念,因此发现公众反对转基因食品的重点是用于批准这些产品的标准(Levidow, Murphy & Carr, 2007)和标签(Dannenberg, 2009),这应该不足为奇。显然,在考虑纳米技术加速引入时可能遵循的轨迹时,需要从这段历史中吸取一些教训(Mehta, 2004;frew, 2010)。因此,对消费者价值观的敏感性(Vendermoere et al., 2009)、一般伦理考虑(Hunt & Mehta, 2006)、偏好(Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004)和风险收益感知必须变得更加重要(Siegrist, Stampfli, & Kastenholtz, 2009)。此外,有强有力的论点认为,纳米产品代表了作为预防性风险管理和监管形式的预防性原则应用的特殊情况(Clift, 2006)。实质等同原则的基础假设是,如果转基因食品具有相同的代谢物和相似的氨基酸和酰胺序列(Baker等人,2006年),在确定的营养和抗营养成分的特定范围内(Novak和Haslberger, 2000年),并且如果它不引入意想不到的人类过敏原(Martens, 2000年),则可以认为转基因食品与天然食品基本等同。如果通过了这三个级别的分析,那么有关食品通常被认为是安全的,不需要额外的监管审查。在加拿大和美国,这一决定也将“新型”或转基因食品排除在标签要求之外。 目前,实质等同是唯一被广泛接受的评估转基因食品的方法。复杂的实验继续表明,转基因食品与天然食品非常相似,但并不等同(Catchpole等人,2005年),尽管很少有标准化的方法或统计技术可用于跨研究或食品进行比较。Pusztai和Bardocz(2006)敦促人们谨慎对待纳米食品和食品中的纳米颗粒,并建议未来的研究集中在营养和毒理学测试方案上,包括纳米食品对新陈代谢、器官和组织发育、内分泌功能和肠道菌群的影响的功能分析。根据Pusztai和Bardocz(2006)的说法,目前没有进行适当的安全测试,这使监管系统的充分性及其对实质等同的过度依赖受到质疑。本文档的完整版还提供另外7页,可通过产品网页上的“添加到购物车”按钮购买:www.igi-global.com/article/nano-based-food-substantialequivalence/52088?camid=4v1此标题可在infosci -期刊、infosci -期刊学科医学、医疗保健和生命科学中找到。向您的图书管理员推荐此产品:www.igi-global.com/e-resources/libraryrecommendation/?id=2
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