On the problems of realizing reliable and efficient ring oscillator PUFs on FPGAs

A. Wild, G. Becker, T. Güneysu
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising way to securely generate and store keys by using the inherent process variations of each chip as a source of randomness. One of the most promising PUFs for FPGAs is the Ring-Oscillator (RO) PUF. In this paper we take a closer look at RO PUFs and their open challenges. Starting from a reference design for a Spartan-6 FPGA based on PUFKY, we show how the RO design can be optimized by taking full advantage of the available resources, reducing the RO area by nearly 50%. Furthermore, we analyze the observed structural bias of the RO PUFs and show how the entropy of the RO PUF can be improved by taking the FPGA structure into account when extracting the PUF response bits. However, we also point out a very important problem of FPGA based RO PUFs that has not gained the needed attention: counter failures. We show that the frequency counter is a very crucial element in RO PUF design that itself is very susceptible to process variations. While the counters might work properly on most devices, in some they fail to count correctly. For example, in one experiment only one out of 22 FPGAs failed to count correctly. Our results therefore show that the correct functioning of the frequency counter is not only design-dependent, but also depends highly on process variations, i.e., on the individual FPGA. We argue that solving this issue is non-trivial, since the internal details of the FPGA are secret and hence circuit-level simulations of an FPGA design are not possible. However, the large security implications of such failures make it inevitable that this problem is solved before RO PUFs on FPGAs can be used in practice.
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在fpga上实现可靠、高效的环形振荡器puf的若干问题
物理不可克隆函数(puf)是一种很有前途的安全生成和存储密钥的方法,它利用每个芯片的固有过程变化作为随机性的来源。环形振荡器(RO)是fpga中最有前途的PUF之一。在本文中,我们将仔细研究RO puf及其开放的挑战。从基于PUFKY的Spartan-6 FPGA的参考设计开始,我们展示了如何通过充分利用可用资源来优化RO设计,将RO面积减少近50%。此外,我们分析了观察到的RO PUF的结构偏差,并展示了如何在提取PUF响应位时考虑FPGA结构来提高RO PUF的熵。然而,我们也指出了基于FPGA的RO puf的一个非常重要的问题,没有得到必要的关注:计数器故障。我们表明,频率计数器是RO PUF设计中非常关键的元素,它本身非常容易受到工艺变化的影响。虽然计数器可能在大多数设备上正常工作,但在某些设备上它们无法正确计数。例如,在一个实验中,22个fpga中只有一个不能正确计数。因此,我们的结果表明,频率计数器的正确功能不仅依赖于设计,而且高度依赖于工艺变化,即单个FPGA。我们认为解决这个问题是不平凡的,因为FPGA的内部细节是秘密的,因此FPGA设计的电路级模拟是不可能的。然而,这种故障的巨大安全影响使得在fpga上的RO puf可以在实践中使用之前解决这个问题是不可避免的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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