Contextualizing Platonism and Decontextualizing Aristotelianism in the Ontology of Music

Abstract

This article argues against a widespread view that links musical Platonism and Aristotelianism with opposite ways of individuating musical works. This view assumes that Platonism is bound to individuate works of music in sonicist and noncontextualist terms, while Aristotelianism is tied to instrumentalist and contextualist accounts on work-individuation. I argue that this assumption is wrong. I provide an argument that shows that the differences between musical Platonism and Aristotelianism concern the existence conditions of musical works qua types, but not their identity conditions. Assuming that the existence and individuation conditions of types are given by their associated properties, I defend that the disagreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism is about the principle of instantiation of properties, regardless if these properties are monadic (sonicism and noncontextualism) or relational (instrumentalism and contextualism).