Prestige without Purpose? Reputation, Differentiation, and Pricing in U.S. Equity Underwriting

Chitru S. Fernando, Vladimir A. Gatchev, A. May, W. Megginson
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引用次数: 30

Abstract

Clustering of IPO underwriting spreads at 7% poses two important puzzles: Is the market for U.S. equity underwriting services anti-competitive and why do equity underwriters invest in reputation-building? This study helps resolve both puzzles. Modeling endogeneity of firm-underwriter choice using a two-sided matching approach, we provide strong evidence of price and service differentiation based on underwriter reputation. High-reputation banks receive average reputational premia equaling 0.65% (0.47%) of average IPO (SEO) underwritten proceeds, which constitutes 10% (13%) of their underwriting spreads. Equity issuers working with high-reputation underwriters receive significant benefits, including higher offer values and lower percentage spreads net of reputational premia.
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没有目的的威望?美国股票承销的声誉、差异化和定价
首次公开募股(IPO)承销价差高达7%,这带来了两个重要的难题:美国股票承销服务市场是否存在反竞争?股票承销商为什么要投资于建立声誉?这项研究有助于解决这两个难题。利用双向匹配方法对公司-承销商选择的内生性进行建模,我们提供了基于承销商声誉的价格和服务差异化的有力证据。高声誉银行获得的平均声誉溢价相当于IPO (SEO)平均承销收益的0.65%(0.47%),占其承销价差的10%(13%)。与声誉良好的承销商合作的股票发行人获得了显著的好处,包括更高的报价价值和更低的声誉溢价净差价百分比。
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