(In)efficient repo markets

T. Dieler, Loriano Mancini, N. Schürhoff
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Repo markets trade off the efficient allocation of liquidity in the financial sector with resilience to funding shocks. The repo trading and clearing mechanisms are crucial determinants of the allocation-resilience tradeoff. The two common mechanisms, anonymous central-counterparty (CCP) and non-anonymous over-the-counter (OTC) markets, are inefficient and their welfare rankings depend on funding tightness. CCP (OTC) markets inefficiently liquidate high (low) quality assets for large (small) funding shocks. Two innovations to repo market design contribute to maximize welfare: a liquidity-contingent trading mechanism and a two-tiered guarantee fund.
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有效的回购市场
回购市场权衡了金融部门流动性的有效配置与抵御资金冲击的能力。回购交易和清算机制是配置与弹性权衡的关键决定因素。两种常见的机制,匿名的中央交易对手(CCP)和非匿名的场外交易(OTC)市场,效率低下,它们的福利排名取决于资金紧张程度。面对大(小)资金冲击,CCP (OTC)市场无法有效地清算高(低)质量资产。回购市场设计的两项创新有助于实现福利最大化:流动性交易机制和双层担保基金。
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