Policing the Sublime: The Metaphysical Harms of Irreligious Clinical Ethics

Abstract

Janet Malek has recently argued that the religious worldview of the clinical ethics consultant should play no normative role in clinical ethics consultation. What are the theological implications of a normatively secular clinical ethics? I argue that Malek’s proposal constitutes an irreligious clinical ethics, which commits multiple metaphysical harms. First, I summarize Malek’s key claims for a secular clinical ethics. Second, I explicate both John Milbank’s notion of ontological violence and Timothy Murphy’s irreligious bioethics to show how they apply to Malek’s secular clinical ethics, resulting in an irreligious clinical ethics. Third, I then show how an irreligious clinical ethics commits metaphysical harms to patients, clinical ethics consultants, and the institution of clinical ethics consultation. I conclude that Malek’s proposal for an irreligious clinical ethics must be rejected to maintain the metaphysical integrity of clinical ethics consultants, patients, and the institution of clinical ethics consultation.