{"title":"Decentralized Pollution Standard Setting with Agglomeration Forces Present in a Model of Specific Firm Mobility","authors":"Mitch Kunce","doi":"10.47260/bej/1213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract\n\nHerein we augment the traditional devolved environmental interjurisdictional-competition model with specific firm mobility in the presence of agglomeration economies. Now the number of firms in a jurisdiction becomes pertinent in the story of decentralized efficiency. Specifically, when agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong, firm movement is subdued. Placed-based environmental policies aimed at swaying a firm's location decision are rendered relatively ineffective. As a result, jurisdictions possess incentives to excessively overprotect environmental quality − a race-to-the-top. Firm taxation effects on devolved efficiency are also examined.\n\nJEL classification numbers: Q51, Q58, R38.\nKeywords: Decentralized environmental regulation, Agglomeration economies, Firm location.","PeriodicalId":278578,"journal":{"name":"Business & Entrepreneurship Journal","volume":" 733","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Business & Entrepreneurship Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47260/bej/1213","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract
Herein we augment the traditional devolved environmental interjurisdictional-competition model with specific firm mobility in the presence of agglomeration economies. Now the number of firms in a jurisdiction becomes pertinent in the story of decentralized efficiency. Specifically, when agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong, firm movement is subdued. Placed-based environmental policies aimed at swaying a firm's location decision are rendered relatively ineffective. As a result, jurisdictions possess incentives to excessively overprotect environmental quality − a race-to-the-top. Firm taxation effects on devolved efficiency are also examined.
JEL classification numbers: Q51, Q58, R38.
Keywords: Decentralized environmental regulation, Agglomeration economies, Firm location.
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