{"title":"Attacks on ID-based signature scheme based upon Rabin's public key cryptosystem","authors":"M.-K. Ko, T. Hwang, C. -. Chang","doi":"10.1109/CCST.1993.386831","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Two attacks are given to show that the identity-based signature scheme proposed by C. C. Chang and C. H. Lin (1991) based upon Rabin's public key cryptosystem is not secure enough. One of the attacks is based on the conspiracy of two users in the system while the other can be performed by anyone alone. It is shown that, in this second attack, the scheme can be broken by anyone (not necessarily a user in the system) who has the ability to observe the communications between the signer and the receiver.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":404786,"journal":{"name":"1993 Proceedings of IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology","volume":"236 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"1993 Proceedings of IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCST.1993.386831","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Two attacks are given to show that the identity-based signature scheme proposed by C. C. Chang and C. H. Lin (1991) based upon Rabin's public key cryptosystem is not secure enough. One of the attacks is based on the conspiracy of two users in the system while the other can be performed by anyone alone. It is shown that, in this second attack, the scheme can be broken by anyone (not necessarily a user in the system) who has the ability to observe the communications between the signer and the receiver.<>
通过两个攻击证明了C. C. Chang和C. H. Lin(1991)基于Rabin的公钥密码系统提出的基于身份的签名方案不够安全。其中一种攻击是基于系统中两个用户的阴谋，而另一种攻击可以由任何人单独执行。结果表明，在第二次攻击中，任何人(不一定是系统中的用户)只要有能力观察签名者和接收者之间的通信，就可以破坏该方案。
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
