{"title":"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?","authors":"Todd J. Zywicki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2130942","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the centerpieces of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation was the creation of a new federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of the Federal Reserve. Few bureaucratic agencies in American history, if any, have combined the simultaneous degree of vast, vaguely-defined power and lack of public accountability of the new bureau. It is an independent agency inside another independent agency (the Federal Reserve). It is presided over by a single director (rather than a multi-member commission structure) appointed for a term of five years and insulated from removal by the President. It has a guaranteed budget drawn directly from the Federal Reserve and is thus outside of Congress’s appropriations process. Its actions are unreviewable by the Federal Reserve and can be checked bureaucratically only by a supermajority vote of the Financial Stability Oversight Commission (FSOC) and only if its actions would imperil the safety and soundness of the American financial services industry.Proponents of the new agency argue that this extreme level of independence is justified in order to provide the new bureau with insulation from political pressures. But the history of regulation has taught that insulation can be isolation, resulting in rudderless and inefficient regulation. In addition, scholars of regulation over the past several decades have identified a number of common pathologies associated with bureaucratic behavior. Astonishingly, the CFPB is structured in such a manner that it virtually guarantees the manifestation of those bureaucratic pathologies in practice: excessive risk-aversion, agency imperialism, and agency tunnel vision. Indeed, it is as if the CFPB were an agency frozen in amber during the Nixon Administration and thawed out today as if it were completely unaware of the lessons of the past several decades on how to structure an effective and efficient regulatory strategy.In the end, by manifesting these bureaucratic pathologies, the CFPB is likely to raise the price and reduce access to credit, thereby harming the very consumers it was founded to protect.","PeriodicalId":271630,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Enforcement by Public Regulators (Sub-Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"19","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Enforcement by Public Regulators (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2130942","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
Abstract
One of the centerpieces of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation was the creation of a new federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of the Federal Reserve. Few bureaucratic agencies in American history, if any, have combined the simultaneous degree of vast, vaguely-defined power and lack of public accountability of the new bureau. It is an independent agency inside another independent agency (the Federal Reserve). It is presided over by a single director (rather than a multi-member commission structure) appointed for a term of five years and insulated from removal by the President. It has a guaranteed budget drawn directly from the Federal Reserve and is thus outside of Congress’s appropriations process. Its actions are unreviewable by the Federal Reserve and can be checked bureaucratically only by a supermajority vote of the Financial Stability Oversight Commission (FSOC) and only if its actions would imperil the safety and soundness of the American financial services industry.Proponents of the new agency argue that this extreme level of independence is justified in order to provide the new bureau with insulation from political pressures. But the history of regulation has taught that insulation can be isolation, resulting in rudderless and inefficient regulation. In addition, scholars of regulation over the past several decades have identified a number of common pathologies associated with bureaucratic behavior. Astonishingly, the CFPB is structured in such a manner that it virtually guarantees the manifestation of those bureaucratic pathologies in practice: excessive risk-aversion, agency imperialism, and agency tunnel vision. Indeed, it is as if the CFPB were an agency frozen in amber during the Nixon Administration and thawed out today as if it were completely unaware of the lessons of the past several decades on how to structure an effective and efficient regulatory strategy.In the end, by manifesting these bureaucratic pathologies, the CFPB is likely to raise the price and reduce access to credit, thereby harming the very consumers it was founded to protect.
多德-弗兰克金融改革法案的核心内容之一是建立一个新的联邦消费者金融保护局(Consumer financial Protection Bureau of federal Reserve)。在美国历史上,很少有官僚机构(如果有的话)能像这个新成立的机构一样,同时拥有巨大的、定义模糊的权力和缺乏公共问责制。它是另一个独立机构(美联储)内部的一个独立机构。它由一名董事(而不是一个由多名成员组成的委员会结构)主持,任期五年,不受总统罢免。它有直接从美联储(fed)获得的保证预算,因此不受国会拨款程序的约束。它的行为不受美联储的审查,只能由金融稳定监督委员会(FSOC)的绝对多数投票进行官僚检查,并且只有当它的行为会危及美国金融服务业的安全和健全时。新机构的支持者认为,为了使新机构免受政治压力,这种极端的独立性是合理的。但监管的历史告诉我们,隔离可能是孤立,导致监管缺乏方向和效率低下。此外,在过去的几十年里,研究监管的学者们已经确定了一些与官僚行为相关的常见病症。令人惊讶的是,CFPB的结构实际上保证了那些官僚主义病态在实践中的表现:过度的风险规避、机构帝国主义和机构狭隘的视野。事实上,CFPB在尼克松政府时期就像一个被冻在琥珀里的机构,今天又解冻了,就好像它完全没有意识到过去几十年在如何构建有效和高效的监管战略方面的经验教训。最终,通过表现出这些官僚主义的病态,CFPB很可能会提高价格,减少获得信贷的机会,从而伤害到它本来要保护的消费者。