Physically Secure Code and Data Storage in Autonomously Booting Systems

J. Götzfried, Johannes Hampel, Tilo Müller
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Abstract

Today, full disk encryption is a common practice to protect data on desktop computers and notebooks from unauthorized physical access. For embedded systems, however, the situation is different and they often lack physical protection. Usually no user or remotely connected system is involved during the boot phase which requires autonomously booting systems. For this paper an entire software stack for secure code and data storage in embedded systems has been designed, implemented and evaluated regarding security aspects and performance. For the security evaluation, physical attacks on the flash chip and RAM access have been taken into account. The system is a combined hardware and software solution and provides a considerable amount of security without a second party involved that could participate in a trust bootstrapping protocol. A symmetric key hierarchy enables the use of applications from different vendors which are not able to decrypt each others software. For code, a signature chain ensures the authenticity of the code being run. For data, integrity is ensured on a per sector basis such that targeted manipulations are not only mitigated but can be detected as well. This is a novel technique that is currently not known from any publicly available full disk encryption system. We show that the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of code and data protected with our system can be ensured provided that small parts of the hardware are considered trusted.
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自主启动系统中的物理安全代码和数据存储
今天,全磁盘加密是一种常见的做法,以保护台式机和笔记本电脑上的数据免受未经授权的物理访问。然而,对于嵌入式系统,情况就不同了,它们通常缺乏物理保护。通常在引导阶段不涉及用户或远程连接的系统,这需要自主引导系统。本文设计、实现了嵌入式系统中用于安全代码和数据存储的整个软件栈,并对其安全性和性能进行了评估。在安全评估中,考虑了对闪存芯片和RAM访问的物理攻击。该系统是一个结合了硬件和软件的解决方案,在没有参与信任引导协议的第二方的情况下提供了相当大的安全性。对称密钥层次结构允许使用来自不同供应商的应用程序,这些应用程序不能相互解密软件。对于代码,签名链确保正在运行的代码的真实性。对于数据,在每个部门的基础上确保完整性,这样不仅可以减轻有针对性的操纵,而且可以检测到。这是一种新技术,目前在任何公开可用的全磁盘加密系统中都不知道。我们表明,只要一小部分硬件被认为是可信的,我们的系统所保护的代码和数据的机密性、完整性和真实性就可以得到保证。
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