A Model for Value Co-Production and Cross-Producer Bundles

H. Bhargava
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Many markets feature an economic structure with value co-created by multiple producers whose outputs are sold as a common bundle by a producer-consortium or independent firm. Examples include in-home video entertainment, technology goods and services, multi-sourced data platforms, and patent pools. This paper develops an economic model to study demand, production choices, revenue-sharing, and relative market power in such markets. Producers in these markets are not rivalrous competitors in the usual zero-sum sense, because output of each casts an externality on production decisions of others and total market demand expands with total output, albeit with diminishing returns. This property allows multiple producers to flourish in equilibrium (vs. just one with the most favorable technological or cost structure), and more so when the market expands less quickly with total output. Equilibrium production quantities of competitors are strategic complements, yet competition between producers does manifest itself, e.g., if one acquires better production technology (i.e., makes value units at lower cost) then the equilibrium production levels of other producers are reduced. Insights are also derived for alternative market structures, e.g., producers have more output and earn higher profit when organized into a distribution consortium (e.g., Hulu, or consortia of zoos or museums) vs. relying on a separate retailer. Mergers between producers have similar effect. The formulation enables us to rigorously answer economic questions ranging from pricing, revenue sharing, and production levels in a static setting, to market dynamics covering both the causes and effects of changes in industry structure.
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价值合作生产与跨生产者捆绑模型
许多市场的经济结构特点是由多个生产者共同创造价值,这些生产者的产出由生产者联盟或独立企业作为一个共同的捆绑包出售。例子包括家庭视频娱乐、技术产品和服务、多源数据平台和专利池。本文建立了一个经济模型来研究此类市场中的需求、生产选择、收益分享和相对市场力量。这些市场中的生产者并非通常意义上的零和竞争对手,因为每个生产者的产出都会对其他生产者的生产决策产生外部性影响,而且市场总需求会随着总产出而扩大,尽管收益会递减。这一特性允许多个生产商在均衡状态下蓬勃发展(相对于只有一个拥有最有利的技术或成本结构),当市场扩张速度低于总产量时更是如此。竞争者的均衡产量是战略互补,但生产者之间的竞争确实表现出来,例如,如果一个人获得了更好的生产技术(即以更低的成本制造价值单位),那么其他生产者的均衡生产水平就会降低。此外,我们还对其他市场结构进行了分析,例如,与依赖单独的零售商相比,生产商在组成分销联盟(如Hulu或动物园或博物馆联盟)时会获得更多的产出和更高的利润。生产商之间的合并也有类似的效果。该公式使我们能够严格回答经济问题,从静态环境下的定价、收入分享和生产水平,到涵盖行业结构变化的原因和影响的市场动态。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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