Corporate Crime, Overcriminalization, and the Failure of American Public Morality

J. Parker
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Abstract

Corporate crime presents an unusual case of American legal exceptionalism. In terms of substantive legal doctrine, it is neither recent nor completely exceptional: the practice of holding corporate entities criminally liable goes back at least 150 years, in both the United States and other systems based on English common law, and occasionally has appeared elsewhere. Where America is exceptional is in its enforcement efforts, and in the social and political context in which the idea of “corporate crime” was invented and promoted.

Outside of the United States, corporate criminal liability as a legal doctrine appears to be gaining ground, especially within some of the EU countries. However, it is unlikely that such changes have or ever will produce the incidence or rigor of criminal law enforcement against corporations observed in the United States, because of profound differences in the legal and political systems.

Within the United States, there have been dramatic changes since 1991, not in the scope of liability doctrines but in enforcement structures. Since that time, previous legal constraints on corporate criminal punishment have been removed, and enforcement policy has begun to spin out of control. This reflects in part the broader problem that America is overcriminalized in general. Compared with peer Western nations having similar crime rates, the United States has an incarceration rate 5-10 times higher, and approximately 5 times higher than the global average. This same pattern of severity extends to corporate criminal prosecutions. Unlike individuals in general, corporations also are subject to a robust system of parallel and cumulative enforcement actions under regulatory law and even private civil lawsuits. Ironically, efforts to reform unduly expansive civil tort law may be accompanied or followed by further expansion in criminal law enforcement. This produces a disproportionate rise in legal compliance costs, and thereby undermines global competitiveness, destroying firms and even entire industries.

Most Western societies treat criminal law enforcement primarily as a morality play and not a principal component of law enforcement. Their punishment practices indicate that their systems recognize the potentially destructive effect of over-reliance on the criminal sanction. In this respect, the American system has lost its compass.
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企业犯罪,过度定罪,以及美国公共道德的失败
企业犯罪是美国法律例外主义的一个不同寻常的例子。就实体法理论而言,这既不是最近才出现的,也不是完全例外:在美国和其他基于英国普通法的制度中,追究公司实体刑事责任的做法至少可以追溯到150年前,偶尔也会出现在其他地方。美国的特殊之处在于它的执法力度,以及“企业犯罪”概念产生和推广的社会和政治背景。在美国以外,公司刑事责任作为一种法律原则似乎正在获得发展,特别是在一些欧盟国家。然而,由于法律和政治制度的深刻差异,这种变化不太可能或永远不会产生在美国所观察到的针对公司的刑事执法的发生率或严谨性。在美国,自1991年以来发生了巨大的变化,不是在责任原则的范围上,而是在执行结构上。从那时起,以前对公司刑事处罚的法律限制已经被取消,执法政策开始失去控制。这在一定程度上反映了一个更广泛的问题,即美国总体上被过度定罪。与犯罪率相似的西方国家相比,美国的监禁率高出5-10倍,大约是全球平均水平的5倍。同样的严厉模式也延伸到了公司刑事起诉。与一般的个人不同,公司也受制于监管法律下平行和累积的执法行动,甚至是私人民事诉讼的健全制度。具有讽刺意味的是,改革过度扩张的民事侵权法的努力可能伴随着刑事执法的进一步扩张。这导致法律合规成本不成比例地上升,从而削弱了全球竞争力,摧毁了企业甚至整个行业。大多数西方社会将刑事执法主要视为一出道德剧,而不是执法的主要组成部分。它们的惩罚做法表明,它们的制度认识到过度依赖刑事制裁的潜在破坏性影响。在这方面,美国的体制已经迷失了方向。
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