A red team blue team approach towards a secure processor design with hardware shadow stack

C. Bresch, Adrien Michelet, Laurent Amato, Thomas Meyer, D. Hély
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Software attacks are commonly performed against embedded systems in order to access private data or to run restricted services. In this work, we demonstrate some vulnerabilities of commonly use processor which can be leveraged by hackers to attack a system. The targeted devices are based on open processor architectures OpenRISC and RISC-V. Several software exploits are discussed and demonstrated while a hardware countermeasure is proposed and validated on OpenRISC against Return Oriented Programming attack.
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一个红队蓝队的方法实现一个安全的处理器设计与硬件影子堆栈
软件攻击通常针对嵌入式系统,目的是访问私有数据或运行受限制的服务。在这项工作中,我们展示了常用处理器的一些漏洞,这些漏洞可以被黑客利用来攻击系统。目标设备基于开放处理器架构OpenRISC和RISC-V。讨论并演示了几个软件漏洞,同时在OpenRISC上提出并验证了针对面向返回编程攻击的硬件对策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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