{"title":"HiPeR - Early Detection of a Ransomware Attack using Hardware Performance Counters","authors":"P. Anand, P. Charan, S. Shukla","doi":"10.1145/3608484","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Ransomware has been one of the most prevalent forms of malware over the previous decade, and it continues to be one of the most significant threats today. Recently, ransomware strategies such as double extortion and rapid encryption have encouraged attacker communities to consider ransomware as a business model. With the advent of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) models, ransomware spread and operations continue to increase. Even though machine learning and signature-based detection methods for ransomware have been proposed, they often fail to achieve very accurate detection. Ransomware that evades detection moves to the execution phase after initial access and installation. Due to the catastrophic nature of a ransomware attack, it is crucial to detect in its early stages of execution. If there is a method to detect ransomware in its execution phase early enough, then one can kill the processes to stop the ransomware attack. However, early detection with dynamic API call analysis is not an ideal solution, as the contemporary ransomware variants use low-level system calls to circumvent the detection methods. In this work, we use hardware performance counters (HPC) as features to detect the ransomware within 3-4 seconds - which may be sufficient, at least in the case of ransomware that takes longer to complete its full execution.","PeriodicalId":202552,"journal":{"name":"Digital Threats: Research and Practice","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Digital Threats: Research and Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3608484","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Ransomware has been one of the most prevalent forms of malware over the previous decade, and it continues to be one of the most significant threats today. Recently, ransomware strategies such as double extortion and rapid encryption have encouraged attacker communities to consider ransomware as a business model. With the advent of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) models, ransomware spread and operations continue to increase. Even though machine learning and signature-based detection methods for ransomware have been proposed, they often fail to achieve very accurate detection. Ransomware that evades detection moves to the execution phase after initial access and installation. Due to the catastrophic nature of a ransomware attack, it is crucial to detect in its early stages of execution. If there is a method to detect ransomware in its execution phase early enough, then one can kill the processes to stop the ransomware attack. However, early detection with dynamic API call analysis is not an ideal solution, as the contemporary ransomware variants use low-level system calls to circumvent the detection methods. In this work, we use hardware performance counters (HPC) as features to detect the ransomware within 3-4 seconds - which may be sufficient, at least in the case of ransomware that takes longer to complete its full execution.