MUMBA: Multi-unit multi-broker auctions for CRNs

N. Riala, M. Al-Ayyoub, Y. Jararweh, H. Salameh
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Abstract

Several studies have highlighted the severe under utilization of licensed spectrum by its incumbent (primary) users. To increase spectrum utilization, studies suggested using a dynamic spectrum access model in both spatial and temporal dimensions. For such a model, the spectrum is continuously monitored and the unused parts of it are allocated to secondary users. This is known as Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), where secondary users (nodes) send their messages (packets) directly to a nearby Secondary Base Station (SBS), which is responsible for forwarding the messages to their designated recipients. In terms of their power sources, there are two types of secondary nodes: continuous power nodes (CPN) and limited power nodes (LPN). An LPN's goal is to send its message with the minimum battery power consumption. To save power, an LPN can use a nearby “idle” CPN as a relay. On the other hand, an idle CPN (which has no packets of its own to send) aims at maximizing the benefit of its resources. These different types of nodes compete with each other to achieve their goals. An auction-based market mechanism is an appealing option to regulate such a competitive environment. It is favored due to its simplicity, efficiency and high utilization of the spectrum. The model consists of a set of brokers (idle CPNs) and an available (unused) spectrum divided into channels. The brokers iteratively issue short-term dynamic spectrum leases of these channels to competing LPNs. They choose a temporary leading broker to run the auction. The leading broker receives the LPNs' bids (which are based on their spectrum demands) and computes the output of the auction (i.e., the set of winners and their payments) with the objective of obtaining maximal revenue. Computing a solution with the maximum revenue is known to be an NP-hard problem even if there is only one broker. We design a greedy algorithm to solve this problem in polynomial time and compare it with the brute-force solution requiring exponential time. We conduct several experiments and compare the two mechanisms in terms of revenue, running time and spectrum utilization. The results show that the greedy algorithm is very fast and produces solutions that are very close (or sometimes identical) to the optimal solution.
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孟买:多单位多经纪人拍卖crn
几项研究突出表明,现有(主要)用户对许可频谱的利用严重不足。为了提高频谱利用率,研究建议在空间和时间两个维度上采用动态频谱接入模型。在这种模式下,频谱被持续监控,未使用的部分被分配给辅助用户。这被称为认知无线网络(crn),辅助用户(节点)将其消息(数据包)直接发送到附近的辅助基站(SBS),该基站负责将消息转发给其指定的接收者。从功率来源来看,辅助节点有两种类型:连续功率节点(CPN)和有限功率节点(LPN)。LPN的目标是用最小的电池功耗发送信息。为了节省电力,LPN可以使用附近的“空闲”CPN作为继电器。另一方面,空闲的CPN(没有自己的数据包要发送)的目标是最大化其资源的效益。这些不同类型的节点相互竞争以实现各自的目标。以拍卖为基础的市场机制是管理这种竞争环境的一个诱人选择。它因其简单、高效和频谱利用率高而受到青睐。该模型由一组代理(空闲cpn)和一个划分为信道的可用(未使用)频谱组成。代理迭代地将这些通道的短期动态频谱租赁给竞争的lpn。他们选择一个临时的主要经纪人来进行拍卖。领先的经纪人接收lpn的出价(基于他们的频谱需求),并计算拍卖的输出(即,获胜者的集合和他们的付款),目标是获得最大的收入。即使只有一个经纪人,计算具有最大收益的解决方案也是一个np困难问题。我们设计了一种贪心算法,在多项式时间内解决该问题,并将其与需要指数时间的蛮力算法进行了比较。我们进行了多次实验,比较了两种机制在收益、运行时间和频谱利用率方面的差异。结果表明,贪心算法是非常快的,产生的解非常接近(或有时完全相同)的最优解。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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