Narrative, Mimesis, and Phronetical Deliberation

Abstract

One of the distinguishing aspects of the phronimos (the person who acts according to phronesis, practical wisdom) is the ability to deliberate well.1 In this article I will explore what it means to deliberate, taking as a starting point Paul Ricoeur’s ethical theory and refl ections on narratives. I will investigate the reasonability and possible advantages of looking at deliberation as a form of narrative. Th is path of investigation will highlight the intrinsic relation between saying and doing in the context of deliberation. It will also shed light on the aspirational aspect of the phronimos’s activity, which is constantly trying to extend narratives in order to tell a story that makes sense to a community. In other words, the phronimos is elaborating narratives in order to propose and promote a common good life within just institutions (Ricoeur 1995: 172). I take the concept of deliberation from the Aristotelian tradition, as Ricoeur does in his “little ethics.”2 However, in the context of this discussion I will not explore how Ricoeur’s appropriation departs from Ar-