{"title":"Was There A Government Expenditures Rule in Disguise During 2014-19? Some Evidence for India","authors":"S. Ganti, Ramesh Jangili","doi":"10.47509/iajfa.2022.v03i02.06","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An expenditure rule takes the form of a limit on real spending by the Government. It is a prerequisite to ensure stability of the economy. Such rules, generally, impose restriction on the budget deficits, if stipulated as a law even in disguise. The purpose is to ensure macro-economic stability by rendering negative externalities, if any, of pursuing an independent fiscal policy from that of a previous government. Such rules are in place, officially, in several advanced and emerging economies (Cordes et al, 2015). In this short study, the authors deploy an easily understandable model and set it against data for India, over the period 1992-93 to 2018-19 split up into three subperiods. These three sub periods roughly approximate the periods when a different political party was in government in New Delhi. The government at the beginning of the third period claims to have observed an expenditure rule in guise, with a view to keeping the ‘deficit’ at 3.5 percent or less. The empirical evidence, however, seems to be slightly in disagreement with the claim.","PeriodicalId":231219,"journal":{"name":"INDO-ASIAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INDO-ASIAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47509/iajfa.2022.v03i02.06","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
An expenditure rule takes the form of a limit on real spending by the Government. It is a prerequisite to ensure stability of the economy. Such rules, generally, impose restriction on the budget deficits, if stipulated as a law even in disguise. The purpose is to ensure macro-economic stability by rendering negative externalities, if any, of pursuing an independent fiscal policy from that of a previous government. Such rules are in place, officially, in several advanced and emerging economies (Cordes et al, 2015). In this short study, the authors deploy an easily understandable model and set it against data for India, over the period 1992-93 to 2018-19 split up into three subperiods. These three sub periods roughly approximate the periods when a different political party was in government in New Delhi. The government at the beginning of the third period claims to have observed an expenditure rule in guise, with a view to keeping the ‘deficit’ at 3.5 percent or less. The empirical evidence, however, seems to be slightly in disagreement with the claim.
支出规则的形式是限制政府的实际支出。这是确保经济稳定的先决条件。一般来说,这些规则对预算赤字施加了限制,如果作为法律加以规定,即使是变相的。其目的是确保宏观经济稳定,方法是消除上届政府实行独立财政政策所带来的负面外部性(如果有的话)。在几个发达和新兴经济体中,这些规则已经正式实施(Cordes et al, 2015)。在这项简短的研究中,作者部署了一个易于理解的模型,并将其与印度1992-93年至2018-19年期间的数据进行对比,这些数据分为三个子时期。这三个子时期大致近似于不同政党在新德里执政的时期。在第三期开始时,政府声称已经遵守了一项幌子的支出规则,目的是将“赤字”保持在3.5%或更低。然而,经验证据似乎与这种说法略有不同。