The Complexity of Verifying Boolean Programs as Differentially Private

Mark Bun, Marco Gaboardi, L. Glinskih
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We study the complexity of the problem of verifying differential privacy for while-like programs working over boolean values and making probabilistic choices. Programs in this class can be interpreted into finite-state discrete-time Markov Chains (DTMC). We show that the problem of deciding whether a program is differentially private for specific values of the privacy parameters is PSPACE-complete. To show that this problem is in PSPACE, we adapt classical results about computing hitting probabilities for DTMC. To show PSPACE-hardness we use a reduction from the problem of checking whether a program almost surely terminates or not. We also show that the problem of approximating the privacy parameters that a program provides is PSPACE-hard. Moreover, we investigate the complexity of similar problems also for several relaxations of differential privacy: Renyi differential privacy, concentrated differential privacy, and truncated concentrated differential privacy. For these notions, we consider gap-versions of the problem of deciding whether a program is private or not and we show that all of them are PSPACE-complete.
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验证布尔程序为差分私有的复杂性
我们研究了在布尔值上工作并做出概率选择的类while程序的差分隐私验证问题的复杂性。在这类程序可以解释为有限状态离散时间马尔可夫链(DTMC)。我们证明了确定一个程序对于特定的隐私参数值是否具有差异隐私性的问题是pspace完备的。为了证明这个问题是在PSPACE中存在的,我们将经典的命中概率计算结果应用于DTMC。为了显示pspace硬度,我们使用了从检查程序是否几乎肯定会终止的问题的简化。我们还表明,逼近程序提供的隐私参数的问题是PSPACE-hard问题。此外,我们还研究了几种差分隐私松弛的类似问题的复杂性:仁义差分隐私、集中差分隐私和截断集中差分隐私。对于这些概念,我们考虑决定一个程序是否私有的问题的间隙版本,并证明它们都是pspace完备的。
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