The MREL Framework Under the Banking Reform Package

Nikos Maragopoulos
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The adoption of the “Banking Reform Package” (CRR2, CRD4, BRRD2, SRMR2) in 2019 led to material changes, among others, in the regulatory framework governing the Minimum Requirement for Own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL). The revised framework aimed at introducing the rules adopted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) to the Union law and addressing the deficiencies of the former framework. As regards the novelties brought in by the new framework, the most significant one pertains to the introduction of a minimum and fixed requirement (Pillar 1 MREL) for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and other large banks. At the same time, all banks are still subject to the bank-specific requirement (Pillar 2 MREL) for which no material amendment in the determination approach is introduced in the revised framework. In practice, the MREL target that banks must meet is the higher of the Pillar 1 MREL and the bank-specific Pillar 2 MREL. Other key elements of the revised framework are related to the obligation for banks to cover a significant part of the MREL with instruments subordinated to liabilities excluded (or likely to be excluded) from bail-in (subordination requirement), the introduction of the internal MREL for subsidiaries of resolution entities and the establishment of harmonized criteria for MREL-eligible liabilities. Furthermore, the revised rules clarify several aspects of the former framework, including the deadline for banks to meet the MREL, the redemption of MREL-eligible liabilities and the measures to address a breach of the MREL. The present paper analyses the aforementioned key elements of the revised MREL framework and assesses its conformity with the TLAC standard, as well as the implications that may arise as a result of its complexity and the discretions provided to resolution authorities. As regards the first point, the analysis indicates that the transposition of the TLAC rules into the Union law not only achieves the target of conformity, but also in some cases the MREL extends beyond the scope and the level required under the international standard. In relation to the nature of the requirement, the MREL framework is characterized by a significant degree of complexity and the discretionary powers assigned upon resolution authorities. Excluding the Pillar 1 MREL applicable to G-SIBs and “top-tier banks”, there is no other single MREL-related requirement that is clear about which banks it applies to and what the level thereof is. All other requirements are subject to decisions taken by resolution authorities, mostly based on unclear criteria. Hence, resolution authorities have extensive powers to decide on the scope of requirements (e.g. Pillar 1 MREL, Pillar 2 MREL, subordination requirement, internal MREL) and other critical aspects (e.g. transitional period for Pillar 2 MREL, redemption of MREL-eligible liabilities, measures to address a breach of the MREL). The discretionary character of the framework allows resolution authorities to translate the MREL rules into their policies in a different way resulting in a divergent application of the MREL across the EU. In addition, discretions foster ambiguity regarding the requirements that banks are obliged to meet, even if they are under the remit of the same resolution authority. As a result, these arrangements cause uncertainty to both banks and investors over the applicable requirements, the MREL needs and the resources required to meet those needs.
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银行改革一揽子计划下的MREL框架
2019年通过的“银行业改革一揽子计划”(CRR2、CRD4、BRRD2、SRMR2)导致了自有资金和合格负债最低要求(MREL)的监管框架等方面的重大变化。修订后的框架旨在将金融稳定委员会(FSB)通过的关于总损失吸收能力(TLAC)的规则引入欧盟法律,并解决前框架的缺陷。关于新框架带来的新奇之处,最重要的是为全球系统重要性银行(g - sib)和其他大型银行引入了最低和固定的要求(支柱1 MREL)。与此同时,所有银行仍须遵守银行特定要求(支柱2 MREL),修订后的框架并未对确定方法进行重大修订。在实践中,银行必须达到的MREL目标是第一支柱MREL和银行特定的第二支柱MREL中较高的一个。修订框架的其他关键要素涉及银行的义务,即使用从属于排除(或可能被排除)内部纾困(从属要求)的负债的工具覆盖MREL的很大一部分,为处置实体的子公司引入内部MREL,以及建立符合MREL资格的负债的统一标准。此外,修订后的规则澄清了前框架的几个方面,包括银行满足MREL的最后期限、MREL合格负债的赎回以及处理违反MREL的措施。本文分析了上述修订后的MREL框架的关键要素,并评估了其与TLAC标准的一致性,以及由于其复杂性和提供给决议当局的自由裁量权而可能产生的影响。关于第一点,分析表明,将TLAC规则转换为欧盟法律不仅达到了一致性的目标,而且在某些情况下,MREL超出了国际标准所要求的范围和水平。就要求的性质而言,MREL框架的特点是相当复杂,并赋予决议机构自由裁量权。除适用于g - sib和“顶级银行”的第一支柱MREL外,没有其他单一的MREL相关规定明确规定适用于哪些银行及其级别。所有其他要求都取决于决议机构作出的决定,这些决定大多基于不明确的标准。因此,处置机构拥有广泛的权力来决定要求的范围(例如第1支柱MREL、第2支柱MREL、从属要求、内部MREL)和其他关键方面(例如第2支柱MREL的过渡期、符合MREL条件的负债的赎回、解决违反MREL的措施)。该框架的自由裁量性质允许决议当局以不同的方式将MREL规则转化为其政策,从而导致MREL在整个欧盟的不同应用。此外,自由裁量权造成了银行必须满足的要求的模糊性,即使它们处于同一决议机构的职权范围内。因此,这些安排给银行和投资者在适用要求、MREL需求和满足这些需求所需的资源方面带来了不确定性。
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