Material Contradictions in Mao's China Edited by Jennifer Altehenger and Denise Y. Ho. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2022. 254 pp. $32.00 (pbk). ISBN 9780295750859

Abstract

academic meritocracy is a microcosm reflecting China’s political meritocracy, also referred to as “democratic meritocracy” (p. 111 and elsewhere), which he forcefully argues is a viable and worthy alternative to Western liberal democracies. I read The Dean of Shandong with great interest, fascinated to see the many ways in which Bell’s experience as a college dean mirrored my own experience at a somewhat smaller college in southern China. His discussions of the changing nature of “internationalization” in China’s higher education system, admissions processes, the hiring and promotion of faculty and staff, the many responsibilities of the Party secretaries in his college and the rather endless meetings for collective decisionmaking all sounded very familiar. I agree that the winnowing process of both faculty and especially staff in China’s higher education system often results in the development and promotion of highly competent faculty and administrators. For example, my former college office manager, a CCP member, is one of the most ethical and competent people I have ever known. My vice deans and Party secretary were very competent, dependable, and a continuous source of good advice. The vice president I most frequently worked with on issues of internationalization, curriculum development and technology-enhanced learning was exceptionally competent, dedicated and always helpful. I fear, however, that Bell overstates his case for China’s bureaucracies as meritocracies. I certainly encountered university administrators who were anything but ethical or competent. Moreover, I am not fully convinced by Bell’s assertion that the virtues of China’s meritocratic structure in academia also apply to other government bureaucracies. Although he acknowledges the possibility of autocratic rule emerging at the pinnacle of China’s meritocracy, I wish he had more fully considered the dominance of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping or Xi Jinping, and reflected more deeply on the possible dangers of conflating academic meritocracy with political meritocracy. Nevertheless, Bell is not arguing for the superiority of China’s “democratic meritocracy” over Western liberal democracy. Instead, he provides a strong and coherent argument for recognition by Western nations that China’s largely meritocratic political system is “morally legitimate” and well justified in placing “substantial constraints on the accumulation of private wealth for the sake of the common good” (p. 125). From this perspective, China warrants respect for its capacity to deliver good governance and steady improvement of human well-being on a par with Western liberal democracies.