{"title":"Hardening Civilian Spacecraft Against Kinetic Attack through Model-Based Systems Engineering","authors":"Edward A. S. Hanlon, O. Yakimenko","doi":"10.1109/AERO55745.2023.10115821","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The United States military recognizes the threat of adversary anti-satellite weapons and has aggressively pursued new system architectures to minimize their potency. Hardening and removing military targets will shift the anti-satellite threat to equally important commercial satellites. Much like commercial shipping in World War II, civilian spacecraft require protection from the same attacks military space architectures are being fortified against. This paper uses Model-based Systems Engineering to explore defensive architectures' ability to protect commercial satellites against both co-orbital and ground launched kinetic attacks. It focuses on a comprehensive analysis of space domain awareness, evasive maneuvers, devices, and co-orbital ‘escort’ spacecraft, to provide a framework for designers and engineers to evaluate and improve spacecraft survivability. Ultimately, it highlights the value of early, decisive action; the efficacy of evasive maneuvers at thwarting series attacks; and the impact of high quality space domain awareness data.","PeriodicalId":344285,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE Aerospace Conference","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE Aerospace Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AERO55745.2023.10115821","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
The United States military recognizes the threat of adversary anti-satellite weapons and has aggressively pursued new system architectures to minimize their potency. Hardening and removing military targets will shift the anti-satellite threat to equally important commercial satellites. Much like commercial shipping in World War II, civilian spacecraft require protection from the same attacks military space architectures are being fortified against. This paper uses Model-based Systems Engineering to explore defensive architectures' ability to protect commercial satellites against both co-orbital and ground launched kinetic attacks. It focuses on a comprehensive analysis of space domain awareness, evasive maneuvers, devices, and co-orbital ‘escort’ spacecraft, to provide a framework for designers and engineers to evaluate and improve spacecraft survivability. Ultimately, it highlights the value of early, decisive action; the efficacy of evasive maneuvers at thwarting series attacks; and the impact of high quality space domain awareness data.