China and its hybrid warfare spectrum

Abstract

ion, this survey uncovers signs of increasing granularity. Among these, Chen Hanghui of China’s Army Command Academy provides specific foreign cases of hybrid warfare in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan with (1) utilization of interest groups, government and military forces, religious sect militia and tribal armed forces, separatist and terrorist organizations, (2) application of conventional operations, guerrilla warfare, maritime ambush and irregular operations, as well as (3) integration of political, economic and military measures.98 As a domestically oriented example, members of the People’s Liberation Army in Beijing and Xinjiang – when dissecting Russian hybrid warfare – emphasize the importance of China expanding its advances in special force war fighting, information warfare, non-traditional military power as well as attack capabilities that enhance survivability, flexibility and ‘rapid response’ (快速反应).99 Such analyses point not only to the soft elements of hybrid warfare, but also to a series of kinetic platforms that China has also been working to develop, including unmanned combat vehicles.100 In mediating between these softer and harder variants of hybrid warfare, Chinese strategic and technical writings tend to encompass nearly every aspect of modern warfare. This hybridization of what is in effect cross-domain warfare makes it difficult to fully understand how it is being applied. However, if hybrid warfare is evaluated along a spectrum and in relation to how other countries are employing it, this can facilitate comprehension of some of the strategic decisions being made by China. This survey reveals that Chinese views on hybrid warfare are largely vested in the actions of the nation state. When victimized by actions that China deems to be hybrid warfare, Chinese interlocutors attribute these activities to a country, rather than to a non-state actor. Given the prevailing view in China that Washington is the origin point and purveyor of such acts, this means that the United States will be the target of Chinese blame and retaliation. This has already played out repeatedly as China confronts domestic protests, terrorist incidents, pandemics and tensions in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. When China becomes the subject of blame, however, the response is the exact opposite. In other words, the role of non-state actors and difficulties of attribution are 103 China and Its Hybrid Warfare Spectrum highlighted. Therefore, it is instructive to observe how Chinese analyses dissect Russia’s alleged successes with hybrid warfare in Ukraine and Syria.101 Given the admiration of Chinese military strategists for Russia’s ability to perfect and surpass the United States in hybrid warfare, it is not beyond reason that they may select a similar set of responses when faced with commonly held threats. Given China’s strong foundation and aspirations in information, cyber and intelligent warfare, its ability to apply hybrid warfare in multiple domains is destined to expand. Moreover, when evaluating Chinese responses along a spectrum, there is a move towards integrating kinetic platforms with varying levels of autonomy into strategizing about hybrid warfare. Thus, while information warfare and cyber warfare may continue to dominate, China’s future rests with intelligent or AI-enabled warfare. Chinese inclusion of unmanned systems and even hypersonic vehicles into hybrid warfare strategic and technical writings indicates that the emphasis on disinformation is increasingly intertwined with cross-domain applications of hard power. In sum, while unrestricted warfare, information warfare, and cyber warfare are likely to remain the core of Chinese discussions of hybrid warfare, Chinese military strategists are poised to undertake a future shift towards the intelligent warfare and kinetic warfare end of the continuum. This makes understanding China’s hybrid warfare spectrum and its nuances of interpretation and application all the more crucial. Doing so will prepare political and military planners for anticipating how the future hybridization of warfare will evolve and how China will respond and employ it.