To Whom the Rules Apply

K. Himma
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Abstract

This chapter is concerned with two arguments for the claim that the norms of an institutional normative system with moral criteria of validity are incapable of guiding behavior (the Guidance Arguments). The problem, on this line of reasoning, is that neither a rule of recognition that validates norms on the basis of moral merit nor a norm that is valid in virtue of moral merit can properly guide the people they must be able to guide to perform law’s conceptual function. This chapter thus challenges the Guidance Arguments. It argues that the guidance function of law does not imply that every legal norm must be capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person. It implies only that every legal norm must be capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person whose behavior it governs.
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规则适用于谁
这一章关注的是两种论证,即具有有效性道德标准的制度规范体系的规范不能指导行为(指导性论证)。按照这种推理思路,问题在于,无论是基于道德价值来验证规范的认可规则,还是基于道德价值而有效的规范,都不能正确地指导人们,它们必须能够指导人们履行法律的概念功能。因此,本章对指导性论点提出了挑战。它认为,法律的指导功能并不意味着每一项法律规范都必须能够指导或告知每一个人的行为。它只意味着每一项法律规范必须能够指导或告知其行为所管辖的每一个人的行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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