{"title":"Identifying and Anticipating Cyberattacks That Could Cause Physical Damage to Industrial Control Systems","authors":"M. Angle, S. Madnick, J. Kirtley, Shaharyar Khan","doi":"10.1109/JPETS.2019.2923970","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Physical control systems are increasingly controlled by reconfigurable, network-enabled devices to increase flexibility and ease commissioning and maintenance. Such capability creates vulnerabilities. Devices may be remotely reprogrammed by a malicious actor to act in unintended ways, causing physical damage to mechanical equipment, infrastructure, and life and limb. In this paper, past examples of actual damage to cyber-physical systems are shown, threats posed by software-controlled variable frequency drives (VFDs) are analyzed, and a small-scale version of an attack on ubiquitous VFD equipment is demonstrated.","PeriodicalId":170601,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Power and Energy Technology Systems Journal","volume":"60 20","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"33","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Power and Energy Technology Systems Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/JPETS.2019.2923970","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
Abstract
Physical control systems are increasingly controlled by reconfigurable, network-enabled devices to increase flexibility and ease commissioning and maintenance. Such capability creates vulnerabilities. Devices may be remotely reprogrammed by a malicious actor to act in unintended ways, causing physical damage to mechanical equipment, infrastructure, and life and limb. In this paper, past examples of actual damage to cyber-physical systems are shown, threats posed by software-controlled variable frequency drives (VFDs) are analyzed, and a small-scale version of an attack on ubiquitous VFD equipment is demonstrated.