The Crawler: Two Equivalence Results for Object (Re)Allocation Problems When Preferences are Single-Peaked

Y. Tamura, Hadi Hosseini
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the "crawler", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined "dual" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the "random priority rule" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the "core from random endowments".
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爬虫:偏好为单峰时对象(再)分配问题的两个等价结果
对于目标再分配问题,如果偏好严格但其他方面不受限制,则顶端交易周期规则(TTC)是主导规则:它是唯一满足效率、禀赋下界和策略抗性的规则;此外,TTC与核心重合。然而,在单峰偏好的子域上,Bade (2019a)定义了一个新的规则“crawler”,它也满足前三个属性。我们的第一个定理表明,爬虫和自然定义的“对偶”规则实际上是相同的。接下来,对于目标分配问题,我们通过根据均匀分布随机选择禀赋轮廓并应用原始定义来定义爬虫的概率版本。我们的第二个定理表明,该规则与Knuth(1996)和Abdulkadiroglu和S\ onmez(1998)证明的“随机优先规则”相同,相当于“随机禀赋的核心”。
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