How to balance respect for diversity and the rights of the vulnerable? (Non-)recognition of forced and underage marriage under the lens of the European Convention on Human Rights

Abstract

AbstractPartly in view of the migratory phenomenon to which Europe is exposed, forced and underage marriages nowadays deserve careful consideration both as social phenomena and as legal institutions. This paper aims to verify whether and to what extent forced and underage marriages should be recognised in Europe. On the one hand, recognising the validity of these acts could arguably clash with fundamental values and rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. On the other hand, it is not possible to a priori exclude that a flat refusal to recognise a marriage validly established abroad might entail a violation of further rights of the spouses and ultimately have detrimental consequences for the parties that the refusal aims to protect. The aim is to assess whether private international law tools and techniques can offer a proper balance between respect for the fundamental values of reception societies and protection of the rights and interests of the parties involved.Keywords: recognition of marriagesunderage marriagesforced marriageshuman rightsHague Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Art 37 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul, 11 May 2011).2 PACE Resolution 2233(2018), Forced Marriage in Europe, adopted on 28 June 2018, para 7.5.2 in combination with para 3; PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), Forced marriages and child marriages, adopted on 5 October 2005, para 12.3 See UNICEF, Child Marriage in West and Central Africa. A Statistical Overview and Reflections on Ending the Practice, 2022, 1–108; UNICEF, Child Marriage in Eastern and Southern Africa, A Statistical Overview and Reflections on Ending the Practice, 2022, 1–100; UNICEF, Mapping of Child Marriage Initiatives in South Asia, 2016, 1–42.4 See Joint general recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, 14 November 2014, paras 21–22; PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), supra n 2, para 8. Art 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child obliges states to protect children from “all forms of physical or mental violence,” and the Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted this all-encompassing formula as including forced and early marriage. The Committee noted that given the specific vulnerability of children to maltreatment the obligation to protect them from all forms of violence should continue to apply when children under the age of 18 attain the age of majority or emancipation through early marriage and/or forced marriage. See Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment no. 13, 18 April 2011, footnote 13. See infra section G.5 UNFPA, State of World Population 2021, 48–49.6 On this issue, see J Ribot, “How Much Family Conduct Do We Need to Regulate through Family Law?”, in M Maclean and J Eekelaar (eds), Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies (Hart, 2013), 273–292.7 Y Lequette, “De la ‘proximité’ au ‘fait accompli’”, in V Heuzé and others (eds) Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Pierre Mayer (Lextenso, 2015), 481–518.8 UNICEF, 115 million boys and men around the world married as children – UNICEF, First ever analysis on child grooms brings global child marriage figures to 765 million, Press release of 6 June 2019, available at https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/115-million-boys-and-men-around-world-married-children-unicef accessed on 1 January 2023.9 Joint general recommendation/General Comment, supra n 4, paras 6–7.10 For instance, Art 27 of Italian law no. 218 on private international law establishes that matrimonial capacity and other conditions for marrying are governed by the national law of each spouse at the time of marriage. Law no. 218, Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, 31 May 1995 (GU n.128 del 03-06-1995 – Suppl. Ordinario n. 68).11 Application no. 51625/08 Ammdjadi v Germany, decision as to admissibility, 9 March 2010, 8.12 Systematic or over-frequent setting aside of foreign laws by means of the public policy exception leads to frustration of private international law, to the extent that it implies a dismantling of its techniques and aims, and gives rise to limping decisions and legal uncertainty. Conflict of laws becomes conflict of civilisations when the public policy exception operates regularly and systematically to exclude the application of entire sectors of foreign law common to a group of States belonging to a specific cultural area because of their contrast with legal principles common in another group of States. One might think of the possible contrast of Islamic family law institutions with legal principles which are consolidated in Europe. On the conflict of civilisations, see J Déprez, “Droit international privé et conflits de civilisations” (1988) Hague Collected Courses, 19-365; M-C Najm, Principes directeurs du droit international privé et conflit de civilisations (Dalloz, 2005); A Malatesta, “Cultural Diversity and Private International Law”, in G Venturini and S Bariatti (eds), Nuovi strumenti del diritto internazionale privato, Liber Fausto Pocar (Giuffré, 2009), 643; L Gannagé, “Les méthodes du droit international privé à l’épreuve des conflits de cultures” (2011) 357 Hague Collected Courses, 235–489.13 See the preamble to the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (The Hague, 14 March 1978). To date the Convention has three State parties: Australia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.14 Art 9 of the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages.15 See Art 11 (3) and (5) of the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages and the Explanatory Report by Ake Malmström.16 See Art 14 of the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages and the comment to Art 14 in the Explanatory Report by Ake Malmström.17 See ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v Austria, no. 30141/04, Judgment of 24 June 2010, para 62; M. and Others v Italy and Bulgaria, Application no. 40020/03, Judgment of 31 July 2012, para 161.18 See Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 10 April 2006, CEDAW/SP/2006/2. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, between spouses, is a customary rule. In contrast, see G Carella, Diritti umani, conflitti di legge e conflitti di civilizzazione (Cacucci, 2011), 50.19 A Del Vecchio argues that it is for this very reason that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not contemplate a right to freely marry. A Del Vecchio, “La tutela dei diritti delle donne nelle convenzioni internazionali”, in T Vassalli di Dachenhausen (ed), Atti del Convegno in memoria di Luigi Sico (Editoriale Scientifica, 2011), 323–324.20 Art 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dwells both on the “full age” and on the “free and full consent” of intending spouses. Art 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 18 December 1979) obliges State parties to ensure the “right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent” and “to specify a minimum age for marriage.” Arts 1 and 2 of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (New York, 7 November 1962) respectively state that “no marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties” and oblige State parties “to specify a minimum age for marriage.” Art 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) in similar terms refers to the “marriageable age” and to the “free and full consent” of the intending spouses. Art 17 paras 2 and 3 of the American Convention on Human Rights refer to “the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry” and state “No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.” Against this background, Art VI (b) of the Maputo Protocol, attached to the African Charter, is an exception as it sets the minimum age for marriage (for women) at 18. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights condemned Mali because it had not raised the marriageable age to 18 in violation of the Maputo Protocol. See African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Association pour le progrès et la défense des droits des femmes maliennes and the Institute for human rights and development in Africa v. Republic of Mali, 11 May 2018. On the Maputo Protocol, see A Mignolli, “Notes on Women’s Rights in Africa” (2021) Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 606–637.21 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950).22 Ex multis A Bucher, “La famille en droit international privé”, (2000) 283 Hague Collected Courses 96–101. This method is generally referred to as a method of “reconnaissance des situations” [recognition of situations] because it aims to give effect to a substantive situation, not to measures adopted by the State of origin to create it. Cf. P Lagarde, “Introduction au thème de la reconnaissance des situations: rappel des points les plus discutés”, in P Lagarde (ed) La reconnaissance des situations en droit international privé (Pedone, 2013), 19–25; “La méthode de la reconnaissance est-elle l’avenir du droit international privé?”, (2014) 371 Hague Collected Courses 19–42; P Mayer, “Les méthodes de la reconnaissance en droit international privé”, in Le droit international privé: esprit et méthodes. Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (Dalloz, 2005), 547–573. In a more nuanced way F Pesce argues that a right to have a personal status, validly formed abroad, recognised in an ECHR Contracting State is emerging in the Court’s case law. Cf. F Pesce, “I child marriages tra tutela dei diritti e portabilità degli status” (2021) Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, in the footnote 96 at 64. The ‘method of recognition’ has been slowly creeping out in some international conventions and national statutes, especially in the field of personal law. See Art 9(1) of the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages (The Hague, 14 March 1978) and Art 31 para 1 (Recognition of foreign marriages) of the Dutch Civil Code. F Salerno underlines that among the risks and shortcomings which this method may give rise to is the encouragement of so-called legal tourism. Cf. F Salerno, “The identity and continuity of personal status” (2019) 395 Hague Collected Courses 55–56.23 See, ECtHR, Muñoz Díaz v Spain, Application no. 49151/07, 8 December 2009, paras 61–64, in which the validity of a Roma marriage was at stake. On the effects of time on the validity of a marriage, see infra section H.24 G Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie (Quelle & Meyer, 1932), 4. The view that nationality as a connecting factor takes into account the cultural links of a person better than other factors is strongly upheld by E Jayme, “Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne” (1995) 251 Hague Collected Courses 167. See also, P Franzina, “The Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation under Regulation (EU) no. 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010” (2011) 3 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, 97.25 Salerno, supra n 22 at 89.26 ECtHR, B. and L. v the United Kingdom, Application no. 36536/02, Judgment of 13 September 2005, para 36; Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application no. 30141/04, Judgment of 24 June 2010, para 62; Z.H. and R.H. v Switzerland, Application no. 60119/12, Judgment of 8 December 2015, para 44.27 AO Cozzi, “Diritto al matrimonio, Art. 12”, in S Bartole, P De Sena and V Zagrebelsky (eds), Commentario breve alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo (Cedam, 2012), 455.28 According to Italian law, for example, a marriage can be challenged by a spouse whose consent has been “extorted with violence or determined by fear of exceptional gravity deriving from causes external to the spouse” [estorto con violenza o determinato da timore di eccezionale gravità derivante da cause esterne allo sposo]. Art 122 of the Italian Civil Code. Circular of the Italian Ministry of the Interior no. 25 of 13 October 2011 on matters of registrability of marriage acts celebrated abroad where documentation of the marital will is missing, acknowledges that: “the consent of both spouses is always an essential substantive requirement for the existence of a valid marriage bond, in the absence of which it is not possible to recognise the marriage because of its apparent contrast with public policy” [il consenso di entrambi i coniugi costituisce sempre un requisito essenziale, di ordine sostanziale, alla sussistenza di un valido vincolo matrimoniale, in mancanza del quale non è possibile riconoscere il matrimonio per chiara contrarietà all’ordine pubblico].29 ECtHR, Pretty v The United Kingdom, Application no. 2346/02, para 61.30 On the notion of a ‘European public order’ elaborated from a comparative analysis of European legal systems, see G Reichelt, “‘Europäischer’ ordre public im autonomen Kollisionsrecht?” (1975) Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, 225; Déprez, supra n 12, 260; O Feraci, L’ordine pubblico nel diritto dell’Unione Europea (Giuffré, 2012), 323–337.31 See, ECtHR, Volodina v Russia, Application no. 41261/17, Judgment of 9 July 2019, paras 73–75, with reference to domestic violence; M. and Others v Italy and Bulgaria, Application no. 40020/03, Judgment of 31 July 2012, paras 99–100; 105; R.H. v Sweden, Application no. 4601/14, Judgment of 10 September 2015, in which the asylum seeker submitted that should the expulsion order against her be enforced she would face a real risk of either being killed because she had refused to agree to a forced marriage before fleeing or being forced to marry someone against her will again on her return. See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, CEDAW/C/GC/35, 26 July 2017, para 16, noting that “Gender-based violence against women may amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in certain circumstances, including in cases of rape, domestic violence or harmful practices.”32 Art 15 para 2 ECHR.33 In this sense, see also P Franzina, “Some Remarks on the Relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR to the Recognition of Family Status Judicially Created Abroad” (2011) Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 612.34 ECtHR, Z.H. and R.H. v Switzerland, Application no. 60119/12, Judgment of 8 December 2015, para 44.35 See supra n 4.36 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNTS 1577, Art 3.37 For cases concerning adoption, surrogacy, and child abduction, see ECtHR, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v Luxembourg, Application no. 76240/01, 28 June 2007, para 133 (“paramount consideration”); Mennesson v France, Application no. 65192/11, judgment of 26 June 2014, para 81 (“paramount consideration”); X v. Latvia, Application no. 27853/09, 26 November 2013, para 95 (“primary consideration” - which is the wording of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 3(1)). On the best interests of the child principle see M Distefano, “The Best Interests of the Child Principle at the Intersection of Private International Law and Human Rights”, in E Bergamini and C Ragni (eds), Fundamental Rights and Best Interests of the Child in Transnational Families (Intersentia, 2019), 157–170 and the literature cited there.38 With specific reference to the right to marry under Art 12 ECHR, see ECtHR, F. v Switzerland, Judgment of 18 December 1987, Application no. 11329/85, para 32; R. and F. v United Kingdom, Application no. 35748/05, Decision of 28 November 2006, 14; Muñoz Díaz v Spain, supra n 23, para 78.39 See supra n 20. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child have included child and forced marriage among “harmful practices.” Joint general recommendation no. 31, supra n 4, paras 20–24.40 See ECtHR, Mennesson, supra n 37, para 84.41 In this sense, see also G Carella, “La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e il diritto internazionale privato”, in G Carella (ed), La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e il diritto internazionale privato (Giappichelli, 2009), 9; Carella, supra n 18, 19.42 ECtHR, Wagner, supra n 37, paras 123–124; ECtHR, Mennesson, supra n 37, paras 99–100.43 ECtHR, Negrepontis-Giannisis v Greece, Application no. 56759/08, judgment of 3 May 2011, paras 60–62; para 90.44 As of July 2022, among the Council of Europe Member States only Azerbaijan has neither signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention. Turkey denounced the Istanbul Convention in March 2021.45 See Art 32 Istanbul Convention and the Explanatory Report to Art 32 – Civil consequences of forced marriages.46 See ECtHR, Y. v Slovenia, Application no. 41107/10, judgment of 28 May 2015, para 104; Talpis v Italy, Application no. 41237/14, judgment of 2 March 2017, para 129.47 The ECtHR has developed an extensive practice of interpreting the ECHR with reference to other international law rules and instruments. In the Demir and Baykara v Turkey judgment, the Grand Chamber attempted to systematise the Court’s jurisprudence, widely referring to interpretative rules codified in the VCLT. See, ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, Application no. 34503/97, judgment of 12 November 2008, paras 76–78; 86. For instance, the Court in this judgment recalls cases in which in interpreting Art 8 of the ECHR it took into account the standards enshrined in the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, even though that instrument had not been ratified by all the State parties to the ECHR (para 81). On this issue, see C Pitea, “Interpreting the ECHR in the Light of “Other” International Instruments: Systemic Integration or Fragmentation of Rules on Treaty Interpretation?”, in N Boschiero and others (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law (Springer, 2013), 545–559.48 For the thesis that the requirement of consent to marriage is a ‘European public order’ rule, see supra section D.49 From a different perspective, one should note that when a State infringes the rules of the Istanbul Convention on forced marriage, at the same time it unavoidably infringes ECHR provisions. In this manner, the ECtHR may indirectly serve as a jurisdictional organ in charge of the application of the Istanbul Convention. In the light of the above, the Istanbul Convention also becomes a material source of law for all EU Member States, for the twofold reason of their being parties to the ECHR and because the EU Court of Justice makes reference to ECtHR jurisprudence to interpret the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, according to Art 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, where the Charter contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and scope are the same as the corresponding rights contained in the ECHR. Therefore, through Article 52(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the prohibition of discrimination, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect for private and family life enter through the door of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as they are interpreted by the ECtHR. These rights become an integral part of the EU legal system ‘enriched’ with the norms of the Istanbul Convention.50 PACE, Resolution 2233(2018), Forced Marriage in Europe, supra n 2, para 7.9; in similar terms, PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), supra n 2, para 14.2.4.51 See recital no. 12 of the Istanbul Convention preamble, where forced marriage is listed among the “serious forms of violence.”52 Because of the explicit reference to sole justification, State parties remain free to diminish the criminal liability of a person for acts committed for the same reasons. For an analysis of international instruments – especially legal instruments relating to the protection of intangible cultural heritage – which include clauses according to which culture cannot be invoked to infringe core human rights, see A Chechi, “When Culture and Human Rights Collide” (2020) Ordine internazionale e diritti umani 846–848.53 PACE Resolution 1468 (2005) Forced marriages and child marriages, supra n 2, paras 3 and 5.54 For this reason a number of authors have criticised the Inlandsbeziehung and the ordre public de proximité theories. While permitting the recognition of situations created outside the forum, they would block and reject the same situation having some connection with the State (in practice the domicile or citizenship of the parties). Nevertheless, since fundamental rights provided in the ECHR must be recognised for each individual regardless of the connection of the case with the State party to the ECHR of the forum, it is not arguably possible to apply ordre public de proximité or Inlandsbeziehung and to distinguish forced marriages depending on their degree of connection with the State of the forum. See Malatesta, supra n 12, 649–650. See also F Mosconi and C Campiglio, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale. Parte generale e contratti (Utet, 2007), 239, which are strongly against the idea of a varying public policy.55 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul, 11.V.2011), para 178.56 PACE Resolution 2233(2018), supra n 2, para 7.9; in similar terms, PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), supra n 2, para 14.2.4. But see Art 16 para 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which in unequivocal terms states that “The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect” and at least in its wording leaves no room for balance.57 In this sense, see Italian Court of Cassation, judgment of 2 March 1999, no. 1739.58 This idea dates back to R Ago, Teoria del diritto internazionale privato (Cedam, 1934), 322. Framing a ‘preliminary question’ correctly is one of the most difficult tasks for a private international lawyer. On this issue, see ex multis P Picone, Saggio sulla struttura formale del problema delle questioni preliminari nel diritto internazionale privato (Jovene, 1971); P Lagarde, “La règle de conflit applicable aux questions préalables” (1960) Revue critique de droit international privé.59 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, Art 13 para 1.60 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (COM(2001) 257 final), 15; See also the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 14 April 2016, Case C-115/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v NA, paras 69–70.61 ECtHR, K. and T. v Finland, Application no. 25702/94, judgment of 12 July 2001, para 150; Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, Application no. 50963/99, judgment of 20 June 2002, para 112; Z.H. and R.H. v Switzerland, Application no. 60119/12, judgment of 8 December 2015, para 42. On the effects of time on the validity of a marriage, see infra section H.62 On this principle see supra section D.63 For the detailed regulation, see Arts 59–61 of the Istanbul Convention.64 For Sweden, see Act 1904:26 on Certain International Relationships on Marriage and Guardianship, Chapter 1 section 8a, as amended by SFS 2018:1973.65 Art 84, para 1 of the Italian civil code.66 Art 84, para 2 of the Italian civil code.67 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, Section 1.68 Of course, it will be necessary to assess whether the requirements to emancipate contemplated in the legal system from time to time are of necessary application. For a focus on the not unequivocal Italian practice, see G Palmeri, “Art. 84”, in G Ferrando (ed), Matrimonio, Commentario del codice civile Scialoja-Branca-Galgano (Zanichelli, 2017), 343–344. The Italian Massimario per l’ufficiale di stato civile is, however, clear cut: “In the event that the age of one or both spouses at the time of the celebration is instead between sixteen and eighteen, it is possible to transcribe the marriage if the conditions set out in the law of the country of origin of the foreign minor are respected” [Nel caso in cui l’età di uno o di entrambi gli sposi al momento della celebrazione sia invece ricompresa tra i sedici ed i diciotto anni, è possibile trascrivere il matrimonio se sono rispettate le condizioni di cui alla legge del paese di appartenenza del minorenne straniero]. Massimario per l’ufficiale di stato civile, 2012 Edition, para 9.1.1.69 With a critical attitude to the Swedish reform, see M Jänterä-Jareborg, “Sweden: New rules on non-recognition of underage marriages”, Conflict of Laws, 2019, available at www.conflictoflaws.net (accessed on 1 January 2023), and by the same author, “Non-recognition of Child Marriages: Sacrificing the Global for the Local”, in G Douglas, M Murch and V Stephens (eds), International and National Perspectives on Child and Family Law (Intersentia, 2018), 267–281; M Bogdan, “Some Critical Comments on the New Swedish rules on Non-recognition of Foreign Child Marriages” (2019) 15 Journal of Private International Law 247–256.70 Cf. German Federal Supreme Court, Decision of 14th November 2018, Case No. XII ZB 292/16; see also Decision of 22nd July 2020, Case No. XII ZB 131/20.71 In this sense, see C Campiglio, “Il matrimonio in età precoce nel diritto internazionale privato” (2020) 4 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 794–795; S De Vido, “Child Marriages, Immigration and the Directive on Family Reunification”, in E Bergamini and C Ragni (eds), Fundamental Rights and Best Interests of the Child in Transnational Families (Intersentia, 2019), 128; F Pesce, “I child marriages tra tutela dei diritti e portabilità degli status”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2021, 54; 57; 66.72 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification OJ L 251.73 Ibid, Art 4 para 5.74 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, COM/2014/210 final, para 2.3.75 European Commission of Human Rights, Janis Khan v United Kingdom, Application no. 11579/85, decision of 7 July 1986.76 CEDAW General Recommendation no. 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations (1994), para 36; European Parliament Resolution of 4 July 2018 Towards an EU external strategy against early and forced marriages – next steps (2017/2275(INI)), para. 1; Joint general recommendation no. 31, supra n 4, para 55; PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), supra n 2, para 12.77 PACE Recommendation 1723 (2005), Forced marriages and child marriages, adopted on 5 October 2005, para 2.1.78 PACE Resolution 2233(2018), Forced Marriage in Europe, supra n 2, para 7.5.2 in combination with para 3; PACE Resolution 1468 (2005), supra n 2, para 12.79 See supra section F.80 Art 11(3), Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages.81 Art 117, para 2, of the Italian Civil Code.82 After stating that “it is not possible to register the marriage between an Italian and a foreigner celebrated abroad when one or both spouses were less than sixteen years old at the time of the celebration, since the minimum age is a public policy limit” [non è possibile trascrivere il matrimonio tra un italiano ed uno straniero celebrato all’estero quando uno od entrambi i nubendi avevano meno di sedici anni al momento della celebrazione, essendo quello dell’età minima un limite di ordine pubblico], the Massimario per l’ufficiale di stato civile highlights that even the marriage of a person under sixteen can be recognised and registered if the application for this purpose is filed one year after that minor has reached the age of majority. Massimario per l’ufficiale di stato civile, 2012 Edition, para. 9.1.1.83 Article 122 of the Italian civil code.84 Ex multis ECtHR, Airey v Ireland, Application no. 6289/73, judgment of 9 October 1979, para 24.85 In this regard it is worth noting that France has extended the limitation period for bringing proceedings for the annulment of marriage. See GREVIO Baseline Evaluation Report France, 28 October 2019, para 198.86 Awareness-raising activities also contribute to the fight against forced marriage by empowering (potential) victims, as they inform them of their rights and encourage them to report forced marriage. See Art 12 para 6 and Art 13 of the Istanbul Convention.