Gatekeeper’s potential privilege—the need to limit DMA centralization

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-08-02 DOI:10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040
Jörg Hoffmann, Liza Herrmann, Lukas Kestler
{"title":"Gatekeeper’s potential privilege—the need to limit DMA centralization","authors":"Jörg Hoffmann, Liza Herrmann, Lukas Kestler","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Article 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore, and competences are centralized on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralization of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This article suggests solutions to mitigate such a risk.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad040","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The Digital Markets Act (DMA) aims at promoting contestable and fair markets for core platform services by setting out obligations for designated gatekeepers. As the DMA does not clearly define these objectives, it comes into conflict with national legislation with overlapping objectives. This may include unfair competition laws and sector-specific regulation. Article 1(5) DMA addresses this conflict by stipulating that Member States may not impose further obligations on gatekeepers for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. The effect this has is that national provisions vis-à-vis gatekeepers may not be applicable anymore, and competences are centralized on the European level more broadly than potentially envisaged by the European legislature. This centralization of competences runs the risk of inadvertently privileging gatekeepers by blocking national laws that are, however, still applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other firms competing with gatekeepers. This article suggests solutions to mitigate such a risk.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
看门人的潜在特权——限制DMA集中化的需要
数字市场法案(DMA)旨在通过规定指定看门人的义务,促进核心平台服务的竞争和公平市场。由于DMA没有明确定义这些目标,它与具有重叠目标的国家立法发生冲突。这可能包括不正当竞争法和特定部门的规定。DMA第1(5)条解决了这一冲突,规定成员国不得为确保可竞争和公平的市场而对看门人施加进一步的义务。其结果是,针对-à-vis看门人的国家规定可能不再适用,权力集中在欧洲一级的范围比欧洲立法机构可能设想的范围更广。这种权力的集中化有可能会阻碍国家法律,从而在无意中赋予看门人特权,而这些法律仍然适用于与看门人竞争的中小企业和其他公司。本文提出了减轻这种风险的解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.
期刊最新文献
Competition policy and the consumer welfare standard The evolution of EU competition law and policy in the pharmaceutical sector: long-lasting impacts of a pandemic From silence to vigilance: overcoming barriers in public reporting of bid-rigging and cartel violations Agency Insights: The first steps of the DMA adventure Why do people think price fixing is unfair? An empirical legal study on public attitudes in the USA
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1