Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI:10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0
Ahrash Dianat, Mikhail Freer
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Abstract

Abstract We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers’ aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.

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二次拍卖的可信度:一项实验性测试
我们提供了第一个直接测试拍卖格式的可信度如何影响竞标行为和最终结果。为了做到这一点,我们进行了一系列的实验室实验,其中卖方的角色由一个人类受试者扮演,他从拍卖中获得收入,并且(取决于治疗)有决定拍卖结果的代理。与理论预测相反,我们发现非可信的第二价格拍卖不能收敛于第一价格拍卖。我们基于卖家对违反规则的厌恶为我们的结果提供了一个行为解释,这被另一个实验所证实。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.70%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized.  Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
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