{"title":"Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel on the Liberal Democratic Constitutional Project","authors":"David Dyzenhaus","doi":"10.1017/aju.2023.45","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I want to explore a tension in Anna Saunders's rich argument because it confronts much scholarship critical of what we can think of as the liberal democratic constitutional project (LDCP), and which has its roots in debates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sparked by the Marxist critique of capitalism. The tension is between the following two claims that she makes in her article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance.” First, LDCP focuses on the formal dimension of institutional design and thereby fails to pay attention to a significant dimension of a constitutional order: its material basis. In this case, the remedy might seem simple: “Pay attention!” The second claim, however, is that the formal structure of LDCP is formal in name only. It has its own material basis in the ideology of neoliberalism. If, then, one is concerned as Saunders is about a material basis that reproduces social inequality and economic exploitation, the remedy is to abandon LDCP. My exploration is through Saunders's attention to the divergent analyses of the Nazi state set out by Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel in the 1930s as the launching pad for her investigation of the structure of thought that underpins LDCP and her suggestion that Fraenkel is responsible for the juridical turn in LDCP. I start with some biography, in part inspired by the way in which Saunders weaves the personal and the political into her narrative. It helps to show that the turn is not in itself problematic and, as I conclude, that material questions need to be posed and answered within the framework of a well-designed constitutional order.","PeriodicalId":36818,"journal":{"name":"AJIL Unbound","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AJIL Unbound","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2023.45","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I want to explore a tension in Anna Saunders's rich argument because it confronts much scholarship critical of what we can think of as the liberal democratic constitutional project (LDCP), and which has its roots in debates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sparked by the Marxist critique of capitalism. The tension is between the following two claims that she makes in her article, “Constitution-Making as a Technique of International Law: Reconsidering the Post-war Inheritance.” First, LDCP focuses on the formal dimension of institutional design and thereby fails to pay attention to a significant dimension of a constitutional order: its material basis. In this case, the remedy might seem simple: “Pay attention!” The second claim, however, is that the formal structure of LDCP is formal in name only. It has its own material basis in the ideology of neoliberalism. If, then, one is concerned as Saunders is about a material basis that reproduces social inequality and economic exploitation, the remedy is to abandon LDCP. My exploration is through Saunders's attention to the divergent analyses of the Nazi state set out by Franz Neumann and Ernst Fraenkel in the 1930s as the launching pad for her investigation of the structure of thought that underpins LDCP and her suggestion that Fraenkel is responsible for the juridical turn in LDCP. I start with some biography, in part inspired by the way in which Saunders weaves the personal and the political into her narrative. It helps to show that the turn is not in itself problematic and, as I conclude, that material questions need to be posed and answered within the framework of a well-designed constitutional order.