{"title":"Going to Yan’an: The Making of China’s New Ruling Class","authors":"Jia Gao","doi":"10.1080/14672715.2023.2263472","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTStudies of China’s ruling elites need to be set in the historical context of their formation and expansion, and the resurgence of the notion of “bloodline” (xuetong lun) and its evolution in the last decade into the red-genes theory (hongse jiyin) have increased this need. Yet there is a gap between the scholarly literature in English on China’s ruling elites and academic and non-academic publications in Chinese on the subject, especially on the Yan’an period (late 1935 until early 1948) of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) expansion. Both advocates of the bloodline concept and the red genes theory are connected to Yan’an, as are numerous other contemporary ruling class families. Based on an analysis of Chinese publications, this article examines understudied aspects of the “going to Yan’an” phenomenon during the Anti-Japanese War from a social positioning perspective. Through considering Yan’an as part of social positioning options and how new groups developed there, this article offers a new perspective on the making of China’s post-1949 ruling elites.KEYWORDS: Yan’ansocial repositioningleft-leaning youthelite formationYan’an spirit AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank the journal editor and the anonymous reviewers for their very detailed and helpful comments on the earlier version of this manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Goodman Citation2000; Gao Citation2018; Bianco Citation2019.2 The bloodline theory highlights the important role of children of communist revolutionaries in Chinese society (Andreas Citation2002). This was once expressed by the following notorious couplet: “the sons of revolutionaries are heroes; the sons of reactionaries are bastards” (laozi yingxiong er haohan, laozi fandong er hundan). See also Walder Citation2004; Wemheuer Citation2019.3 Editorial board Citation2013.4 The notion of red-genes was first used by Xi Jinping in 2013, and it has since been expanded to stress the importance of inheriting the revolutionary ideals and beliefs of the CCP and promoting people with red-genes to leadership roles. See Lam Citation2015; Ranade Citation2023.5 Li Citation2009.6 Zhang Guotao (1897-1979) was, like Mao Zedong, a founding member of the CCP. After losing a power struggle with Mao, he joined the KMT in 1938 and then, after the CCP was victorious in China’s civil war, he went into exile in British-controlled Hing Kong. In 1968 he and his wife. Yang Zilie, settled in Ontario, Canada.7 Zhang Citation1998, 447. He quoted the following lines of the poet Lu You (1125-1210) from his poem 游西山村 (“Roaming in Mountain West Villages”): “Over numerous mountains and streams, I had my doubts that I could find the road. Then out of the shade of the willows, came bright flowers and another village.”8 Walder Citation2009, 112. See also Zhang Citation2016.9 Lam Citation1992, 2.31; Gao Citation2023, 138.10 Johnson Citation1962; Bianco Citation1995; Selden Citation1995a, Citation1995b; Keating Citation2014.11 French Citation2009.12 Bisson Citation1973.13 Esherick Citation2022.14 Seybolt Citation1986; Dai Citation1994; Saich and Yang Citation1996; Cheek Citation1997. A considerable number of more recent publications by Chinese scholars focus on the personal and family lives of CCP cadres, as well as social and community activities in the region beyond politics and war.15 Johnson Citation1977, 766. See also Dirlik Citation1989; Garver Citation1991; Wu Citation1976.16 Selden Citation1995b. See also Johnson Citation1962; Teiwes and Sun Citation1995.17 Jiang Citation2014.18 Apter Citation1993; Apter and Saich Citation1994; Dutton Citation1996.19 Apter Citation1993, 208.20 Dittmer Citation1996.21 Seybolt Citation1971; Bianco Citation1995; Selden Citation1995a.22 Thaxton Citation1977; Keating Citation2014.23 Cheek Citation1997.24 Perry Citation2002; Leese Citation2013.25 Hartford Citation1989; Saich Citation1994; Feng and Goodman Citation2000; Keating Citation2014.26 Selden Citation1995a, 8.27 Denton Citation2013; Matten Citation2022.28 Holm Citation1991; Hung Citation1994.29 Seybolt Citation1986; Dai Citation1994; Chen Citation1990, Citation1996.30 Feng and Goodman Citation2000.31 Stranahan Citation1983; Keating Citation1994; Saich Citation1994; Spakowski Citation2020, Citation2021.32 Feng and Goodman Citation2000; Goodman Citation2000; McQuaide Citation2016; Griffin Citation1976; Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984; Chang and Halliday Citation2005.33 Ip Citation2005.34 Gao Citation2022, Citation2023.35 Tsou Citation2000; Cui Citation2000.36 Xia Citation2000, 60; Cheng Citation2013, 12.37 Lü Citation2021; Chen Citation2020.38 Wang Citation2021. Even the authors of some CCP-sponsored publications have acknowledged the role of this factor.39 Li Citation2020.40 Chang Citation2003, 154. As an important system to distribute basic consumption goods among communist followers before the mid-1950s, gongji zhi or gongjizhi has not been translated properly into English. Many have simply translated it as a “supply system,” while some have lately updated this to a “system of free supplies.” See Lü Citation2021, 80.41 Huang Citation2004, 4. See also Chen Citation2011; Shu Citation2015.42 Chen Citation2006; van de Ven Citation2017. There has also been strong criticism of the unequal basis of what critics have labeled the military-communist supply system in CCP-controlled regions.43 Cheek Citation1997.44 Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984.45 Zhu Citation2007, 45.46 Yang Citation2000, 254. See also Hu Citation2005; Zhu Citation2007; Meng et al. Citation2012; Gong Citation2019.47 Mitter Citation2013, 191.48 Gao Citation2018, 222. See also Ma Citation2018, 6.49 Yu Citation2022.50 Hu Citation2022, 1.51 Zhang Citation2019.52 Sa Citation2012.53 Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984.54 Zheng Citation2006. Also see: https://www.marxists.org/chinese/zhengchaolin/index.htm.55 Johnson Citation2016, 311. See also Tsoi Citation2015.56 Xie and Zhu Citation2020.57 Liu Citation2009; Liu and Liu Citation2021.58 Zhu Citation2007.59 Wang Citation2009.60 Yao Citation2020.61 Hu Citation2022.62 Dai Citation2015.63 Table 1 also includes three leaders who, like Xi Zhongxun, married twice within this period.64 Sina History Citation2015.65 Hao Citation2016, 1.66 Hu Citation2022, 3.67 Li Citation2017, 5.68 Zhu Citation2007, 250.69 Pei Citation2015, 355.70 Xu and Ma Citation2021.71 Ge Citation2013.72 Zhao and Ye Citation2023.73 Zhang Citation2017. This college was also known as Shaanbei Public School or Shaanbei Gongxue in Chinese. See Gao Citation2018, 222; Esherick Citation2022, 18474 Zhu Citation2007.75 Tang Citation2016, 213.76 Cui Citation2019, 1.77 Zhang Citation2015.78 He Citation2017.79 It was officially named the Northwest Youth National Salvation Federation during the war years because of the CCP and KMT alliance.80 Wang Citation2022.81 Zhu and Hu Citation2016.82 Since the 1980s, this special status has also been reflected in the official distinction of retired veteran cadres (lixiu) from retired ordinary citizens (tuixie).83 Liu Citation2019.84 Selden, Citation1995a, 214.85 Li Citation2021.86 He Citation2006; Dong Citation2016.87 Zhong Citation2019.88 Yang and Zhang Citation2015. The translation is based on Cleverley Citation2000, 83; Wang Citation2020, 61.89 Xu Citation2011.90 Jin Citation2015.91 Du Citation2019.92 Mao Citation1965, 177.93 Gao Citation2023, 27.Additional informationFundingThis work has received no external funding.Notes on contributorsJia GaoJia Gao is a professor of Chinese Studies at the Asia Institute, the University of Melbourne. He has authored the following books: Chinese Activism of a Different Kind (Brill, 2013); Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurship in Australia from the 1990s (Elsevier, 2015); Social Mobilisation in Post-Industrial China (Edward Elgar, 2019); Chinese Immigration and Australian Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), and Aspirational Chinese in Competitive Social Repositionings (Anthem, 2023).","PeriodicalId":46839,"journal":{"name":"Critical Asian Studies","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Critical Asian Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2023.2263472","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACTStudies of China’s ruling elites need to be set in the historical context of their formation and expansion, and the resurgence of the notion of “bloodline” (xuetong lun) and its evolution in the last decade into the red-genes theory (hongse jiyin) have increased this need. Yet there is a gap between the scholarly literature in English on China’s ruling elites and academic and non-academic publications in Chinese on the subject, especially on the Yan’an period (late 1935 until early 1948) of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) expansion. Both advocates of the bloodline concept and the red genes theory are connected to Yan’an, as are numerous other contemporary ruling class families. Based on an analysis of Chinese publications, this article examines understudied aspects of the “going to Yan’an” phenomenon during the Anti-Japanese War from a social positioning perspective. Through considering Yan’an as part of social positioning options and how new groups developed there, this article offers a new perspective on the making of China’s post-1949 ruling elites.KEYWORDS: Yan’ansocial repositioningleft-leaning youthelite formationYan’an spirit AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank the journal editor and the anonymous reviewers for their very detailed and helpful comments on the earlier version of this manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 Goodman Citation2000; Gao Citation2018; Bianco Citation2019.2 The bloodline theory highlights the important role of children of communist revolutionaries in Chinese society (Andreas Citation2002). This was once expressed by the following notorious couplet: “the sons of revolutionaries are heroes; the sons of reactionaries are bastards” (laozi yingxiong er haohan, laozi fandong er hundan). See also Walder Citation2004; Wemheuer Citation2019.3 Editorial board Citation2013.4 The notion of red-genes was first used by Xi Jinping in 2013, and it has since been expanded to stress the importance of inheriting the revolutionary ideals and beliefs of the CCP and promoting people with red-genes to leadership roles. See Lam Citation2015; Ranade Citation2023.5 Li Citation2009.6 Zhang Guotao (1897-1979) was, like Mao Zedong, a founding member of the CCP. After losing a power struggle with Mao, he joined the KMT in 1938 and then, after the CCP was victorious in China’s civil war, he went into exile in British-controlled Hing Kong. In 1968 he and his wife. Yang Zilie, settled in Ontario, Canada.7 Zhang Citation1998, 447. He quoted the following lines of the poet Lu You (1125-1210) from his poem 游西山村 (“Roaming in Mountain West Villages”): “Over numerous mountains and streams, I had my doubts that I could find the road. Then out of the shade of the willows, came bright flowers and another village.”8 Walder Citation2009, 112. See also Zhang Citation2016.9 Lam Citation1992, 2.31; Gao Citation2023, 138.10 Johnson Citation1962; Bianco Citation1995; Selden Citation1995a, Citation1995b; Keating Citation2014.11 French Citation2009.12 Bisson Citation1973.13 Esherick Citation2022.14 Seybolt Citation1986; Dai Citation1994; Saich and Yang Citation1996; Cheek Citation1997. A considerable number of more recent publications by Chinese scholars focus on the personal and family lives of CCP cadres, as well as social and community activities in the region beyond politics and war.15 Johnson Citation1977, 766. See also Dirlik Citation1989; Garver Citation1991; Wu Citation1976.16 Selden Citation1995b. See also Johnson Citation1962; Teiwes and Sun Citation1995.17 Jiang Citation2014.18 Apter Citation1993; Apter and Saich Citation1994; Dutton Citation1996.19 Apter Citation1993, 208.20 Dittmer Citation1996.21 Seybolt Citation1971; Bianco Citation1995; Selden Citation1995a.22 Thaxton Citation1977; Keating Citation2014.23 Cheek Citation1997.24 Perry Citation2002; Leese Citation2013.25 Hartford Citation1989; Saich Citation1994; Feng and Goodman Citation2000; Keating Citation2014.26 Selden Citation1995a, 8.27 Denton Citation2013; Matten Citation2022.28 Holm Citation1991; Hung Citation1994.29 Seybolt Citation1986; Dai Citation1994; Chen Citation1990, Citation1996.30 Feng and Goodman Citation2000.31 Stranahan Citation1983; Keating Citation1994; Saich Citation1994; Spakowski Citation2020, Citation2021.32 Feng and Goodman Citation2000; Goodman Citation2000; McQuaide Citation2016; Griffin Citation1976; Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984; Chang and Halliday Citation2005.33 Ip Citation2005.34 Gao Citation2022, Citation2023.35 Tsou Citation2000; Cui Citation2000.36 Xia Citation2000, 60; Cheng Citation2013, 12.37 Lü Citation2021; Chen Citation2020.38 Wang Citation2021. Even the authors of some CCP-sponsored publications have acknowledged the role of this factor.39 Li Citation2020.40 Chang Citation2003, 154. As an important system to distribute basic consumption goods among communist followers before the mid-1950s, gongji zhi or gongjizhi has not been translated properly into English. Many have simply translated it as a “supply system,” while some have lately updated this to a “system of free supplies.” See Lü Citation2021, 80.41 Huang Citation2004, 4. See also Chen Citation2011; Shu Citation2015.42 Chen Citation2006; van de Ven Citation2017. There has also been strong criticism of the unequal basis of what critics have labeled the military-communist supply system in CCP-controlled regions.43 Cheek Citation1997.44 Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984.45 Zhu Citation2007, 45.46 Yang Citation2000, 254. See also Hu Citation2005; Zhu Citation2007; Meng et al. Citation2012; Gong Citation2019.47 Mitter Citation2013, 191.48 Gao Citation2018, 222. See also Ma Citation2018, 6.49 Yu Citation2022.50 Hu Citation2022, 1.51 Zhang Citation2019.52 Sa Citation2012.53 Witke Citation1977; Terrill Citation1984.54 Zheng Citation2006. Also see: https://www.marxists.org/chinese/zhengchaolin/index.htm.55 Johnson Citation2016, 311. See also Tsoi Citation2015.56 Xie and Zhu Citation2020.57 Liu Citation2009; Liu and Liu Citation2021.58 Zhu Citation2007.59 Wang Citation2009.60 Yao Citation2020.61 Hu Citation2022.62 Dai Citation2015.63 Table 1 also includes three leaders who, like Xi Zhongxun, married twice within this period.64 Sina History Citation2015.65 Hao Citation2016, 1.66 Hu Citation2022, 3.67 Li Citation2017, 5.68 Zhu Citation2007, 250.69 Pei Citation2015, 355.70 Xu and Ma Citation2021.71 Ge Citation2013.72 Zhao and Ye Citation2023.73 Zhang Citation2017. This college was also known as Shaanbei Public School or Shaanbei Gongxue in Chinese. See Gao Citation2018, 222; Esherick Citation2022, 18474 Zhu Citation2007.75 Tang Citation2016, 213.76 Cui Citation2019, 1.77 Zhang Citation2015.78 He Citation2017.79 It was officially named the Northwest Youth National Salvation Federation during the war years because of the CCP and KMT alliance.80 Wang Citation2022.81 Zhu and Hu Citation2016.82 Since the 1980s, this special status has also been reflected in the official distinction of retired veteran cadres (lixiu) from retired ordinary citizens (tuixie).83 Liu Citation2019.84 Selden, Citation1995a, 214.85 Li Citation2021.86 He Citation2006; Dong Citation2016.87 Zhong Citation2019.88 Yang and Zhang Citation2015. The translation is based on Cleverley Citation2000, 83; Wang Citation2020, 61.89 Xu Citation2011.90 Jin Citation2015.91 Du Citation2019.92 Mao Citation1965, 177.93 Gao Citation2023, 27.Additional informationFundingThis work has received no external funding.Notes on contributorsJia GaoJia Gao is a professor of Chinese Studies at the Asia Institute, the University of Melbourne. He has authored the following books: Chinese Activism of a Different Kind (Brill, 2013); Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurship in Australia from the 1990s (Elsevier, 2015); Social Mobilisation in Post-Industrial China (Edward Elgar, 2019); Chinese Immigration and Australian Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), and Aspirational Chinese in Competitive Social Repositionings (Anthem, 2023).
期刊介绍:
Critical Asian Studies is a peer-reviewed quarterly journal that welcomes unsolicited essays, reviews, translations, interviews, photo essays, and letters about Asia and the Pacific, particularly those that challenge the accepted formulas for understanding the Asia and Pacific regions, the world, and ourselves. Published now by Routledge Journals, part of the Taylor & Francis Group, Critical Asian Studies remains true to the mission that was articulated for the journal in 1967 by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars.