The rule of reason and the fundamentals against more presumption-based illegality legal standards: highlights on CADE’s decisions on digital economy issues

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-08-26 DOI:10.1093/jaenfo/jnad042
Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Otávio Augusto de Oliveira Cruz Filho, Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo
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Abstract

Abstract This article advocates against more presumption-based illegality legal standards. The focus is on the Rule of Reason analysis, which is in line with CADE’s case laws for analysing unilateral conducts, distinguishing between restraints with an anti-competitive effect (or resulting in conduct likely to cause such injury) that are harmful to the consumer, and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest. In this sense, the article recalls some basic concepts, such as market power, dominant position, concentration indexes, and its interactions, since the recent discussions appear to have forgotten its basics. Moreover, a brief analysis of CADE’s procedures and the Brazilian Competition system, especially the analyses of unilateral conduct cases, is made in order to present a background for the readers. At the end, we report three digital antitrust cases judged by Cade to demonstrate the steps used by the authority in order to reach a decision on the case. In a nutshell, CADE has not shifted the analysis of unilateral conduct from the use of the rule of reason to a more presumption-based illegality approach.
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理性规则和反对更多基于假设的非法法律标准的基本原则:CADE在数字经济问题上的决定重点
摘要本文主张反对更多的以推定为基础的违法性法律标准。重点是理性规则分析,这与CADE的案例法分析单边行为一致,区分对消费者有害的具有反竞争效果(或导致可能造成这种伤害的行为)的限制,以及对消费者最有利的刺激竞争的限制。从这个意义上讲,本文回顾了一些基本概念,如市场力量、主导地位、集中度指数及其相互作用,因为最近的讨论似乎已经忘记了它的基础。此外,简要分析了CADE的程序和巴西竞争制度,特别是对单边行为案件的分析,以便为读者提供背景。最后,我们报告了Cade审判的三个数字反垄断案件,以展示当局为了对案件作出裁决而使用的步骤。简而言之,CADE并没有将对单边行为的分析从使用理性规则转向更基于假设的非法方法。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.
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