Democracy Under Occupation: Coalition Government Formation and Survival in Iraq and Palestine

Abstract

Abstract While existing research on coalition government formation and durability has significantly enhanced our understanding of coalition processes, it remains heavily focused on (1) the experiences of established democracies in Europe and on (2) the various roles of domestic institutions and actors. In this article, we examine the interplay of external interference and domestic actors to explain the success and failure of coalition government formation in the context of fragile democracies. We ask: How does external interference impact government coalition formation? Drawing on Domestic Opposition Theory ( dot ), we explore two cases of coalition government efforts in the Middle East: post-elections in Iraq in 2018 and in Palestine in 2006. Findings show that, in the case of Palestine, external interference – financial boycott of Hamas-led government and support for Fatah against Hamas – played a key role in the eventual failure of the governing coalition. In Iraq’s case, widespread public domestic opposition to continued external influence, particularly from Iranian-backed interests, played a defining role in coalition formation processes.