Revisiting the Software-Efficient Stream Ciphers RCR-64 and RCR-32

Abstract

Abstract The synchronous stream ciphers RCR-64 and RCR-32 designed by Sekar, Paul and Preneel are strengthened variants of the ciphers TPy and TPypy (designed by Biham and Seberry), respectively. The RCR ciphers have remained unbroken since they were published in 2007. In this paper, we present arguments that not only support the designers’ security claims but suggest, in general, that the ciphers are secure against several classes of cryptanalytic attacks. We find that the ciphers are best used with 256-bit keys and 384-bit IVs. We also suggest ways to protect software implementations of the RCR ciphers against (cache-)timing and processor flag attacks. Our performance evaluation suggests that the protected implementation of the RCR-64 encrypts long messages at speeds comparable to some of the fastest stream ciphers available today. Consequently, we find that the RCR ciphers may be well suited for PC-based applications in general and streaming audio / video applications in particular. This is the first paper to present a detailed study on the security and performance of the RCR ciphers.