The indelicate balance of terror: Nuclear deterrence stability in a world of three nuclear superpowers

Abstract

AbstractAlbert Wohlstetter’s seminal essay of the early Cold War years, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” calls for revisiting in the current climate of geopolitics and military technology. The possible emergence of China as a near peer competitor with the United States and Russia in strategic nuclear forces changes the dynamics of nuclear deterrence, arms control and strategic stability in Asia and globally. In addition, future deterrence stability will also be challenged by changes in technology, including hypersonic weapons, improved missile defense capabilities, competition in the cyber and space domains, and the uncertain impacts of game changers such as artificial intelligence and nanotechnology. As well, containment of nuclear weapons spread cannot be guaranteed, given the dissatisfaction of some existing and aspiring nuclear weapons states with the present international order. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2, (1959): pp. 211-34, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html2 Stephen J. Cimbala and Adam B. Lowther, “Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 41, no. 3 (2022): pp. 282-95, April, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2057736. See also: Col. Stephen Reny, USAF, “Nuclear-Armed Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 4 (2020): pp. 47-76.3 Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Occasional Paper, July 2016), www.rusi.org. See also: Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of Cybersecurity (2017), pp. 1-12, doi:10.1093/cybsec/tyw0174 Dr. Steven Lambakis, Space as a Warfighting Domain: Reshaping Defense Space Policy, National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, no. 499 (2021) www.nipp.org.5 Henry Sokolski, “Pyongyang Goes Nuclear – This Time in Space,” The National Interest, March 7, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/pyongyang-goes-nuclear%E2%80%94-time-space-2062816 For related discussion, see: Krista Langeland and Derek Grossman, Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA943-1.html7 See CPT Matthew R. Bigelow, “LSCO, PNT, and the Space Domain,” Mad Scientist Laboratory, February 16, 2023, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/434-lsco-pnt-and-the-space-domain/8 For additional discussion on this topic, see: Zachary Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Drones of Mass Destruction: Drone Swarms and the Future of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons,” War on the Rocks, February 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/drones-of-mass-destruction-drone-swarms-and-the-future-of-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-weapons/. See also: Zachary Kallenborn, “Meet the future weapon of mass destruction, the drone swarm,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 5, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/meet-the-future-weapon-of-mass-destruction-the-drone-swarm9 For example, see: Dr. George Galdorissi and Dr. Sam Tangredi, “Algorithms of Armageddon: What Happens When We Insert AI into Our Military Weapons Systems,” Presentation to Department of Defense, Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program, April 27, 2021, https://nsiteam.com/?s=algorithms+of+armageddon, and Vincent Boulanin, “Regulating ­military AI will be difficult. Here’s a way forward,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 3, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/03/regulating-military-ai-will-be-difficult-heres-a-way-forward/10 Nancy A. Youssef, “China’s Swelling Nuclear Stockpile Makes It a Growing Rival to U.S., Pentagon Finds,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-swelling-nuclear-stockpile-makes-it-a-growing-rival-to-u-s-pentagon-finds-11669741977. See also: William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “A 2nd New Nuclear Missile Base for China, and Many Questions About Strategy,” New York Times, July 6, 2021,https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/us/politics/china-nuclear-weapons.html11 For expert analysis, see: Brad Roberts, et. al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, Report of a Study Group Convened by the Center for Global Security Research (Livermore, CA: U.S. Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Spring 2023), https://cgsr.llnl.gov/event-calendar/2023/2023-03-23; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, US Strategy and Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-strategy-and-force-posture-for-an-era-of-nuclear-tripolarity/; and Keith B. Payne and David J. Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Threat Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, Occasional Paper, Volume 2, Number 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, August 2022, esp. pp. 35-50), https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf12 James Acton, “Don’t panic about China’s new nuclear capabilities,” Washington Post, June 30, 2021, byhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/30/dont-panic-about-chinas-new-nuclear-capabilities/13 Author’s estimates. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James J. Tritten for use of a model originally developed by him and subsequently adapted by the author. Dr. Tritten is not responsible for its use here.14 Keith B. Payne and David J. Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Threat Environment: What is Different and Why It Matters (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, National Institute Press, August 2022), www.NIPP.org15 See, in particular, the distinction between easy and difficult deterrence in Payne, Shadows on the Wall: Deterrence and Disarmament (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2020), Ch 2 and pp. 136-146. For critiques of deterrence theory as applied to post-Cold War issues, see: David A. Cooper, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between Deterrence and Armageddon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2021); Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); Andrew Futter, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: SAGE, 2015); Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Henry Holt – Times Books, 2012); Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012; Michael Krepon, Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); and Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).16 An extensive literature exists on the Cuban missile crisis. See, in particular: Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edition (New York: Longman, 1999); and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1962 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).17 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 221.18 Ben Macintyre, The Spy and the Traitor (New York: Broadway Books – Penguin Random House, 2019), pp. 142-159.19 For a more expansive discussion on these points, see: David A. Cooper, Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age: Between Disarmament and Armageddon (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2021).Additional informationNotes on contributorsStephen J. CimbalaStephen J. Cimbala (sjc2@psu.edu) is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine. An award-winning Penn State teacher, Dr. Cimbala is the author of numerous works in the fields of national security studies, nuclear arms control and other topics. His recent research has focused on U.S. nuclear modernization, arms control and deterrence in the 21st century.