Secured credit and bankruptcy resolution

Abstract

Accepted wisdom holds that secured creditors favor liquidation of a debtor in bankruptcy even where the debtor may be more valuable as a going concern. This is false wisdom, however. Holders of senior claims can be expected to favor liquidation prior to a debtor's bankruptcy because the return on such claims are capped by the amount owed while debtor asset values fluctuate. But bankruptcy is a day of reckoning that can eliminate a creditor's exposure to value fluctuation. For this reason, we expect that modern bankruptcy practice, with the secured creditor often firmly in control, does not unduly encourage liquidation. In fact, we expect any bias to favor reorganization, which can be manipulated for the benefit of any party in control of the bankruptcy process. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. In a broad study of US corporate bankruptcy cases, we find that secured credit is positively and significantly correlated with the reorganization of insolvent debtors.