Towards an account of basic final value

Abstract

ABSTRACTOrdinary and philosophical thought suggests recognizing a distinction between two ways something can be of final value. Something can be of final value in virtue of its connection to other things of value (‘non-basic final value’) or something can be of final value regardless of its connection to other things of value (‘basic final value’). The primary aim of this paper is to provide an account of this distinction. I argue that we have reason to draw this distinction as it helps avoid certain problems. I criticize accounts of this distinction due to Warren Quinn, Fred Feldman, and Michael Zimmerman. I then provide my own positive account which incorporates several of the insights of those accounts while avoiding their pitfalls. I conclude by relating my account to issues concerning partiality and appropriate attitudes.KEYWORDS: Final valuebasic final valuepro-attitudesFred FeldmanMichael Zimmerman Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 As the examples illustrate, by things of value, I have in mind facts, events, states of affairs, or ways the world could be. I don’t have in mind specific concrete objects, like a frying pan. See fn. 3 for further relevant discussion.2 See, for instance, Brentano (Citation1902, 15f.), Ross (Citation1939, 279, 282), Ewing (Citation1947, 146ff.) Chisholm (Citation1986, 47ff.), Anderson (Citation1993, 2–3), Lemos (Citation1994, 6ff.), Scanlon (Citation1998, 78ff.), Zimmerman (Citation2001), Audi (Citation2004, 125). Merely maintaining that there is a substantive normative connection in no way identifies which property cluster is more fundamental. Further, this assumption does not require the particular kind of buck-passing popularized by Scanlon that is open to the wrong kind of reason objection. For a discussion of this last point, see Zimmerman (Citation2010).3 I focus on relationships between states of affairs of final value. Some authors might be interested in the relationships between concrete things that are of final value. For instance, Langton (Citation2007) suggests that something—e.g. a wedding ring—might be of final value but in virtue of something else—e.g., a personal relationship (see also Korsgaard (Citation1983)). These cases are sometimes called cases of ‘extrinsic final value,’ since the wedding ring is of final value, but the ‘source’ of its value is extrinsic to it. Since these cases involve individual objects, they are not the focus of my discussion. It’s an interesting question how exactly views about extrinsic final value interact with my proposals here. I don’t see any grand conflict. After all, if an object is of extrinsic final value, there’s a state of affairs about that object and its source of value that is, presumably, of final value. But I hope to explore this question in future work. For a negative view of how they might interact, see Bradley (Citation2006); for a critical discussion of extrinsic final value in general, see Tucker (Citation2016).4 The reasons are drawn from Harman (Citation1967), Feldman (Citation2000), and Zimmerman (Citation2001), though the presentation is mine. See also Moore (Citation1912, 36ff.) and Ross (Citation1930, 68ff.).5 I don’t assume that the value of complex states of affairs is always determined exclusively by the value of its parts. Nonetheless, I do assume that sometimes the value of complex states of affairs is determined at least partially by the value of its parts. Further, I do not assume that if the value of a complex state of affairs is determined by the value of its parts, then it is determined in a simple, additive way.6 For my discussion here, I want to leave open the possibility that there are some states of affairs that are not of basic value but whose value is not fully explained by states of affairs of basic value. If there are such states of affairs, then a full reckoning of the final value of a complex state of affairs—like an entire possible world—might have to be take them into consideration as well. For an opposite approach, see Feldman (Citation2000, 333) (thanks to a reviewer and Peter Finocchiaro for discussion of this topic).7 In brief, suppose S is of basic final value. From Basic Final Value 3 (b) it follows that we are not required to adopt any pro-attitudes towards any proper parts of S. Thus, from Basic Final Value 3 (a), it follows that no proper part of S is of basic final value. Suppose some proper part of S, S*, is of final value but not basic final value. On Zimmerman’s definition of final value (Citation2001, 122), S* contains some parts that are of basic final value. Given the transitivity of parthood, it would then follow that S contains a part that is of basic final value, which we already know cannot happen. Thus, no proper part of S can be of non-basic final value. Since all final value is basic or non-basic, if S is of basic final value, then no proper part of S is of any final value.8 For a fuller development of this criticism of Zimmerman, see Perrine (Citation2018).9 Ross (Citation1930, 138) thought that considerations of merit of goods and evil like pleasure and pain were relevant to their final value and disvalue. But Ross doesn’t explicitly endorse the view I describe here.10 Value conferring properties are not always less or more determinate properties of a CVCP. A value conferring property might simultaneously lack relevant information while also containing irrelevant information. (Consider, for instance, the property of experiencing some pleasure in a beer on a Tuesday.) In other words, while there are always non-CVCP on either side of the CVCP, not all non-CVCP will fit on a sliding scale with a CVCP.11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to address some of these issues.12 For more sophisticated accounts of this kind, see Fumerton (Citation1990, 132–2), Rønnow-Rasmussen (Citation2022, chp. 8), and Tenen (CitationForthcoming). For critical discussion, see Perrine (Citation2023).13 For related discussions, see Blanshard (Citation1961, 287–289), Lemos (Citation1994, 16–18; Citation2011); Olson (Citation2009); Bykvist (Citation2009); Zimmerman (Citation2001, 119–123; Citation2011, 472–480), Tappolet (Citation2016, 105–110), McHugh and Way (Citation2022).14 Some might posit the existence of so-called agent-relative value. It might be that the appropriateness of adopting pro- and con-attitudes is sufficient for agent-relative value, even if it is not sufficient for final value. But notice that the mere existence of agent-relative value, on its own, wouldn’t block this contradiction. One would still have to reject or modify some of these principles—presumably Final Value and Final Disvalue. For discussions of agent-relative value, see Smith, (Citation2003), Portmore (Citation2005), Schroeder (Citation2007), Wallace (Citation2010, 519ff.), Cullity (Citation2015), Johnson (Citation2021).15 Additionally, appropriateness or fittingness don’t seem emendable to the prima facie/ultimate facie distinction. So one couldn’t salvage Lemos’ view simply by replacing the property of obligation with these other properties.16 McHugh and Way (Citation2022, 254–256) offer a superficially similar response to Zimmerman. However, it is not clear that they are discussing adopting attitudes towards states of affairs. So it’s not clear that their response falls within the scope of this work.17 For helpful feedback and discussion of these issues, I thank David Fisher, Hao Hong, Noah Lemos, Nick Montgomery, Timothy O’Connor, Harrison Waldo, Phil Woodward, Michael Zimmerman as well as several anonymous reviewers for the journal.