Varieties of Grounding Skepticism

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY MONIST Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI:10.1093/monist/onad017
David Mark Kovacs
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Abstract

Abstract: Skepticism about grounding is the view that ground-theoretic concepts shouldn’t be used in meta­physical theorizing. Possible reasons for adopting this attitude are numerous: perhaps grounding is unintelligible; or perhaps it’s never instantiated; or perhaps it’s just too heterogeneous to be theor­­­­­etically useful. Unfortunately, as currently pursued the debate between grounding enthusiasts and skeptics is insufficiently structured. This paper’s purpose is to impose a measure of conceptual rigor on the debate by offering an opinionated taxonomy of views with a reasonable claim to being “skeptical.” I argue that carving up logical space into pro- and anti-grounding views isn’t especially helpful; rather, we should recognize various degrees of ground-theoretic involvement depending on how inflationary our understanding of the theoretical term ‘ground’ is.
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各种基于基础的怀疑主义
摘要:对基础的怀疑是指在元物理理论中不应该使用基础理论概念的观点。采取这种态度的可能原因有很多:也许接地是难以理解的;或者它从来没有实例化过;或者,它可能只是太异质了,在理论和道德上都不实用。不幸的是,正如目前所追求的,接地爱好者和怀疑论者之间的争论是不够结构化的。本文的目的是通过提供一种固执己见的观点分类,并合理地声称自己是“怀疑论者”,从而在辩论中强加一种概念上的严谨性。我认为,将逻辑空间划分为支持和反对接地的观点并不是特别有用;相反,我们应该认识到,根据我们对理论术语“地面”的理解有多么膨胀,地面理论参与的程度是不同的。
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来源期刊
MONIST
MONIST PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
11.10%
发文量
34
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