From Bad to Worse: The Continuous Dilemma Facing Parliaments in European Economic and Fiscal Governance

Abstract

Abstract Analysing how the roles of national parliaments and the European Parliament have changed in European economic governance since the euro crisis, this article argues that their situation has deteriorated in the post-Next Generation EU regime. It identifies structural factors impeding more effective parliamentary engagement, relates these to empirical evidence about the role of domestic legislatures and the European Parliament and mirrors these practices against constitutional interpretations concerning the democratic role of parliaments in budgetary matters. The broader Economic and Monetary Union architecture has grown to encompass a variety of rules and mechanisms, many of which are located outside of the treaties and the budget of the Union. As a result, parliaments lack formal powers that would guarantee them meaningful participation rights in European economic and fiscal governance. The key to more effective parliamentary involvement is ensuring that the parliaments can genuinely shape policies and that a strong link is established between elections and budgetary politics.