“Encore Merci de Votre Collaboration et Bravo!” Albert Van Buylaere, a Belgian Intelligence Agent during World War II

Abstract

AbstractAlthough World War II intelligence and action services are an important research topic in current Belgian intelligence studies, researchers until recently never focused solely on the Benoît network in their studies. However, this organization was of vital importance for the successful transmission of the intelligence that had been gathered by the Belgian government and State Security in London. One of Benoît’s key members was Albert Van Buylaere who was considered “brilliant” by his superiors. This article gives an overview of his motives and actions and gives a first impression of why he was so sought after by various intelligence agencies during the Cold War. After a brief discussion on the organization and activities of this network and the main events around it, the focus will shift to his activities. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kees Schuyt, Universitair verzet (1940–1945), maatschappelijk verzet en de waarde van wetenschap: Een drieluik (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2012), p. 18; Marc Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie,” in Memorial Volume Intelligence and Action Agents, edited by Roger Coekelbers, Marc Cools, Robin Libert, Veerle Pashley, Jaak Raes, David Stans, and Renaat Vandecasteele (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2015), pp. 95–96.2 Fernand Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45: de inlichtings- en actiediensten in België (Tielt: Lannoo, 1992), p. 19.3 For an overview of the activities of each group, see, for example, Emmanuel Debruyne, La guerre secrète des espions belges 1940–1944 (Bruxelles: Racine, 2008); Marie-Pierre d’Udekem d’Acoz, Voor Koning & vaderland: De Belgische adel in het verzet (Tielt: Lannoo, 2013); Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie.”4 A period known as the “repression” and “epuration: in Belgium (1944–1949).5 Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 21-22; Emmanuel Debruyne, “La maison de verre: Agents et réseaux de renseignements en Belgique. 1940-1944” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, 2006), p. 29.6 Peter Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” in Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 3.7 Jean Fosty, “De Belgische netten in Frankrijk,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 2 (1972), p. 220.8 Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” p. 3.9 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 48; Etienne Verhoeyen, België Bezet 1940–1944: Een synthese (Brussel: BRTN-Educatieve Uitgaven, 1993), p. 261.10 Free translation: “A bewildering spectacle of people gathering intelligence, grouping together, and forming a network, but not knowing how to pass on that information.” Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 21.11 Francis Balace, “Des milliers d’yeux dans la nuit: Origine et typologie des services de renseignement et d’action 1940-1944,” in Memorial Volume Intelligence and Action Agents, edited by Roger Coekelbers, Marc Cools, Robin Libert, Veerle Pashley, Jaak Raes, David Stans, and Renaat Vandecasteele (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2015), p. 77.12 Wim Meyers and Frans Selleslagh, De vijand te lijf: De Belgen in het verzet (Antwerpen: Helios, 1984), p. 33; Debruyne, La guerre secrète des espions belges, p. 346.13 Robin Libert, “In vogelvlucht: De geschiedenis van 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat,” in De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, edited by Marc Cools, Koen Dassen, Robin Libert, and Paul Ponsaers (Brussel: Politeia, 2005), p. 37.14 For more information about this agreement, see: Etienne Verhoeyen and Emmanuel Debruyne, “Les années londoniennes: La Sûreté de l’État en exil,” in Memorial Volume Intelligence and Action Agents, edited by Roger Coekelbers, Marc Cools, Robin Libert, Veerle Pashley, Jaak Raes, David Stans, and Renaat Vandecasteele (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2015), pp. 61–63.15 The Funkabwehr (Funkabwehr der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was a radio counterintelligence service established in 1940 and led by Oberstleutnant (the German equivalent of Lieutenant Colonel) Hans Kopp. Throughout the war, the Funkabwehr functioned as the main German signals intelligence organization, primarily monitoring and intercepting radio transmissions from occupied territory. In addition, the transmissions of the Funkabwehr themselves provided very little information to the Allied Forces. Their type-X devices were part of Enigma, a coding system that even the geniuses at Bletchley Park found extremely difficult to decipher.16 Paul Louyet, België in de Tweede Wereldoorlog: Deel 4: het verzet (Kapellen: De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1984), p. 51.17 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, pp. 20–22. However, a comment should be made here. Clarence, led by Walthère Dewé (“le géant de la Résistance”), was characterized by a high degree of professionalism. For example, it was the only organization with a real “board of directors.” This can be explained from a historical perspective: Clarence was the successor to the WWI intelligence network La Dame Blanche, which, during the Interbellum, was transformed into a “stay-behind network” of the SIS, under the name Corps d’Observation belge. With its experience from WWI and its relationship with the British, Clarence was able to demonstrate an efficiency that was unmatched by any other organization, including foreign ones. Clarence, aptly described by Emmanuel Debruyne as “Clarence, toujours en avance,” was therefore a role model for all other intelligence organizations in occupied territory.18 Libert, “In vogelvlucht,” pp. 23–48; Verhoeyen and Debruyne, “Les années londoniennes,” pp. 47–68. This tactic was already used by the Romans because couriers in possession of the imperial seal had free access to the cities. In addition to their official duties, these couriers often delivered personal messages and conveyed valuable information.19 Robin Liefferinckx, “The Rise and Fall of the Benoît Network,” Cahiers Inlichtingenstudies, Vol. 7 (2017), p. 14.20 For his modus operandi, see ibid.21 Debruyne, La guerre secrète des espions belges, p. 142.22 Ibid., p. 16.23 File Hervé Doyen, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Hervé Doyen. Limoux is located in the southeastern, and therefore unoccupied, part of France, near Carcassonne. Thanks to its location at the foot of the Pyrenees, it was an ideal stop during the journey (read: escape) from Belgium to Spain.24 Liefferinckx, “The Rise and Fall of the Benoît Network (1940–1943),” p. 23.25 Jean Dujardin, “De dienst Luc (zomer 1941–zomer 1942),” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 6 (1980), p. 45.26 Liefferinckx, “The Rise and Fall of the Benoît Network (1940–1943),” p. 28.27 Fosty, “De Belgische netten in Frankrijk,” p. 190.28 In October 1941, for example, Doyen traveled to Belgium, much against the wishes of the State Security. Doyen’s intention was to reorganize the Belgian part of his intelligence network as a result of the total chaos that had broken out due to the betrayal of Armand Bollinne. The State Security, because of his all too good relationship with the French, was particularly upset about this: “Le commandant Doyen […] n’avait aucune raison de s’immiscer en Belgique. Il n’y avait […] pas été envoyé par le chef du service à Londres et […] il n’avait pas à s’occuper du travail de recherche de renseignements en Belgique.” Cf. Letter from the Administrator of State Security to the Prime Minister, 15 June 1942, in CEGESOMA, AA 884, Papers William Ugeux, No. 503.29 Liefferinckx, “The Rise and Fall of the Benoît Network (1940–1943),” p. 34.30 This section is based on the numerous documents (interrogations by the French police, activity reports, the forms submitted to the State Security in order for the agents to obtain accreditation as an intelligence and action agent, reports to and from the authorities in London, telegrams, and) in Albert Van Buylaere’s personal file at CegeSoma, unless quoted or unless otherwise stated.31 Report on the interrogation of A. Van Buylaere by H. Brives, 27 November 1941, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Albert Van Buylaere.32 File Jean-Marie Derscheid, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, No. 131.33 Free translation: “I realized that I could be of great help to him and we decided to go back to Belgium to build a network.” Cf. Report on the interrogation of A. Van Buylaere by H. Brives, 27 November 1941, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Albert Van Buylaere.34 Free translation: “The information in question related exclusively to the identification of German troops occupying Belgium. I have no knowledge that any other information was given by Doyen or others.” Cf. Report on the interrogation of J. Van de Vloet by G. Hellebuyck, 5 May 1942, in CEGESOMA, AA 884, Papers William Ugeux, No. 224.35 File Jean-Marie Derscheid, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333.36 Dujardin, “De dienst Luc (zomer 1941–zomer 1942),” pp. 62–69.37 Free translation: “1) He mixed everything in Belgium, 2) He is linked to the French Deuxième Bureau, 3) He mixes everything in France, 4) He keeps a copy of intelligence for himself.” Cf. Report from Sabot to London, 15 December 1941, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Hervé Doyen.38 Free translation: “I only have one solution. You must choose between Benoît and Sabot. One of us has to leave France as soon as possible.” Cf. Report from Sabot to London, 16 January 1942, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Hervé Doyen.39 Liefferinckx, “The Rise and Fall of the Benoît Network (1940–1943),” p. 34.40 Debruyne, “La maison de verre,” p. 636.41 Free translation: “I must inform you of the brilliant activity of Lieutenant Van Buylaere (codename BOUL). Boul is doing very well.” Cf. Report from Sabot to London, 23 May 1942, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Albert Van Buylaere.42 Free translation: “We demand strict discipline and formal compliance with our orders, and this in your own interest. Thank you again for your cooperation and congratulations!” Cf. X, “Note pour V.B.,” in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Albert Van Buylaere.43 See Emmanuel Debruyne, C’était Tégal: Un service de renseignements en Belgique occupée (Bruxelles: Labor, 2003).44 Free translation: “Behold, their famous French protection!” Cf. Report from Sabot to London, 18 September 1942, in CEGESOMA, AA 1333, Archives of the State Security, personal file Hervé Doyen.45 Debruyne, “La maison de verre,” p. 301.46 For more information, see Robin Libert and Robin Liefferinckx, “Albert Van Buylaere, inlichtingenagent tijdens twee oorlogen,” in Het Schaduwleger. Van clandestiniteit naar herinnering, edited by Robin Liefferinckx, Emmanuel Debruyne, Robin Libert, Dirk Martin, Laurence van Ypersele, and Marc Cools (Oud-Turnhout: Gompel & Svacina, 2020), pp. 191–238.47 “Certificat Albert Van Buylaere,” 92e promotion section de l’artillerie (1936), École Royale Militaire, Service des Archives.48 Free translation: “… a lived story, a documentary and not a fiction, that can serve as a lesson. It is about recounting how an important form of espionage is carried out in our own country, undoubtedly with the help of dozens and dozens of Belgians who allow themselves to be seduced by visions of a rich life and by the intoxication of leading an adventurous existence.” Cf. “Tafelgenoegens met een minzaam diplomaat,” Gazet van Antwerpen, 25 April 1968, p. 4.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRobin LiefferinckxRobin Liefferinckx holds a master’s degree in criminology from the Free University of Brussels (2016). He currently works as an operational team leader at the Belgian National Crisis Centre, and is a board member of the Belgian Intelligence Studies Centre. In addition, he is the Secretary of the Royal Union of Intelligence and Action Services. In this capacity, he is engaged in research into intelligence networks during World War II. He published several articles on this subject and was the final editor of an edited book on the memory and commemoration of the activities of intelligence and action agents. The author can be contacted at robin.liefferinckx@rusra-kuiad.be.