From strategic partner to co-aggressor: Russia’s attempts to lure Belarus into the war in Ukraine

Abstract

ABSTRACTAlthough Belarus is one of Russia’s strategic partners after the outbreak of the war in Donbas relations between the two states were increasingly tense. Since 2014, Alexander Lukashenko has refused to recognize the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and has tried to mediate the conflict by hosting peace talks in Minsk. Moreover, in 2018 and 2019, he refused Vladimir Putin’s proposals to deepen integration with Russia within the Union State. However, since the beginning of post-election protests and the imposition of harsh sanctions by the West, Alexander Lukashenko has tried to retain power and get closer to Russia. That is why he made a series of concessions to his Russian counterpart agreeing to adopt a new military doctrine of the Union State and to organize the military drills “Allied Resolve” on the territory of Belarus. This article examines how the Belarusian president reacted to Vladimir Putin’s attempts to lure him into the Russo-Ukrainian war throughout 2022. The paper shows that although initially, Alexander Lukashenko succumbed to Putin’s pressure to allow the Russian army to use Belarus to invade Ukraine, afterward he acted cautiously, avoiding at all costs the direct involvement of the Belarusian army in the war.KEYWORDS: Alexander LukashenkoBelarusVladimir PutinRussiaUkraine Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. In his speech to the National Assembly on January 28, 2022, Alexander Lukashenko claimed that he would allow the Belarusian army to participate in a conflict only in two cases: if faced with an attack on Belarusian independence and sovereignty, or if Russia was the target of aggression by the West.2. In a speech three days after the outbreak of war, Alexander Lukashenko denied the involvement of the Belarusian army in the conflict but said he would send it to Ukraine only at the express request of his counterpart Vladimir Putin.Additional informationFundingThe research leading to these results has received funding from the EEA Grants 2014-2021, under Project”Interdisciplinary Research on Russia’s Geopolitics in the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean”, contract no. 35/2021.Notes on contributorsRobert Gabriel ȚicălăuRobert Gabriel Țicălău is currently working as a Research Assistant at the Romanian Center for Russian Studies at the University of Bucharest. He holds a BA in Security Studies and an MA in International Relations from the University of Bucharest. His research interests include the evolution of political regimes within the ex-Soviet space, the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region, and Belarusian foreign policy.