Elites and economic policy in South Africa’s transition and beyond

Firoz Khan, Seeraj Mohamed
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The complicity of the economic leadership of the ANC in squashing progressive economic transformation horizons is directly connected to the survival and institutionalisation in the present of late-apartheid neoliberalised economic policy. Ultimately, the corporate elite’s exertion of their state-expanded powers, their co-option of selected members of the black political elite and the ANC’s economic policy self-emasculation has further strengthened multinational corporations’ domination of SA’s markets, which were already highly concentrated, and limited present and future possibilities for inclusive development of the SA economy.KEYWORDS: Apartheidtransitioncorporate eliteseconomic liberalisationdemocratic consolidation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The ANC-commissioned Making Democracy Work (1993) is informed by structuralist and post-Keynesian approaches to economic policy wherein demand and under-full employment are key problems. The growth driver proposed is state-led social and infrastructure investment that crowds im and is followed by private sector investment (Padayachee Citation1998, 438–439).2. Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011) discuss progressive economics, and Padayachee and Fine (Citation2019) details associated policies and for a discussion of progressive macroeconomic policy and its of relevance to South Africa3. The is both a description and an analytical framework for understanding the evolution of SA’s system of accumulation (Fine and Rustomjee Citation1996).4. The term ‘free market’is not about reducing the role of the state. Without laws, policies, security and courts, market freedom is neither possible nor guaranteed (Fine and Saad-Filho Citation2017, 694–695). In the neoliberal frame, the free market entails redirection and transformation of the control and role of the state in social and economic reproduction. Macroecomic policies are aligned to the prescripts of both the Washington and Wall Street Consensus (Hickel Citation2021).5. The GNU ruled from April 1994 to February 1997.6. For a useful summary of the consequences, see Padayachee and Van Niekerk (Citation2019, 230–233).7. Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011) discuss progressive economics, and Padayachee and Fine (Citation2019) details associated policies for of progressive macroeconomic policy and its relevance to SA. For a more general discussion of progressive economics see (Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011).8. With full control of the NP in the 1970s, P.W. Botha created an ‘imperial presidency’ - no longer accountable to cabinet – that subordinated ‘all sectors of society, public and private alike’ to the national security state paradigm of the securocrats (O’Malley, Citationnd). Botha rationalised state structures, creating numerous cabinet committees, under the command of the new State Security Council. The Council presided over a national security management system, responsible for the co-ordination of ‘all aspects of government policy’ – ‘everything deemed connected to the security of the state now fell under its purview from foreign policy to the price of bread’ ((O’Malley, Citationnd). In late 1977, a secret committee, comprising senior military officials and business leaders, was convened ‘“to understand the other’s needs”’ (Minter Citation1986, 286–287, original emphasis). The thirteen-man Defence Advisory Council later established brought together Afrikaner and English speaking business leader (Minter Citation1986, 287).9. The relationship between the western powers and the elites of SA’s large corporations during the intensification of the Cold War in southern Africa deserves lengthy discussion. The Carlton and Goodhope Conferences institutionalised the partnership between Botha, his securocrats and corporate elites. The corporate elites shared close ties with western governments whom they viewed as key allies in the southern Africa's Cold War. The election of Jimmy Carter to President of the USA (1977 to 1981) provided a boost to SA’s corporate elites. The Carter administration was against escalating sanctions against SA but launched a ‘serious reform initiative’ (Minter Citation1986, 281–282). At this time, the USA’s ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, was in contact with Harry Oppenheimer. They opposed economic sanctions, and publicly declared that businesses acting together could end apartheid (Minter Citation1986, 282; Young, Citation2017: 169–70). In May 1977, Oppenheimer invited Young to address the South African Chamber of Commerce and to reside in his home. After the SA visit, Young met with ‘African leaders’ in Mozambique and secured agreement on the Carter’s administration’s southern African plans to arrest the ‘communist scouge in Africa’ (Young, Citation2017: 171). The positive responses from Oppenheimer and the SA business sector, encouraged President Carter to proceed with their plans. The Carter administration entered into ‘aggressive partnerships’ with the ‘frontline states’ -– -neighbouring countries who provided the ANC military training sites and served as launching pads to infiltrate SA (O’Malley, nd.) – to mediate between business people and freedom fighters (Young, Citation2017: 171). In November 1979, P.W.Botha, at the Carlton Conference, launched the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), an organisation aimed at re-establishing the dominance of the apartheid state and its partners in big business in the southern African region.10. In their management of the transition, the concerns of the business elites of the MEC and finance conglomerates (that controlled most of the economy) extended beyond politically influential ANC leaders. The elites were also uneasy about other wealthy (usually white) South African businesspeople and individuals exploiting opportunities presented by patronage of politically connected individuals. Spicer and his Anglo colleagues worried that opportunistic patronage of the latter type could create negative perceptions, particularly amongst the constituency of the ANC and its allies, that could undermine the strategic long-game of the conglomerates in the relationships they had been nurturing with certain ANC leaders. Spicer, referring to influential ANC and other liberation movement leaders, told Du Toit (2022: 96), “We had people who had nothing, and they’ve got large families, and then they see how others are living who have been here and built up capital, and then they say we should be on that level, and why aren’t we?” Many ANC leaders very quickly developed close relationships with wealthy businesspeople during the transition. For example, Douw Steyn, the insurance and real estate magnate, housed Mandela in his mansion after his divorce from Winnie Mandela in 1990. Steyn later built a villa for Mandela and Graca Machel on his private game reserve. According to Bantu Holomisa, former head of the Transkei Bantustan, Thabo Mbeki’s lavish fiftieth birthday party, in 1992, was sponsored by Sol Kerzner, the casino magnate, who allegedly in exchange wanted assistance to quash his corruption trial in the Transkei (Brummer Citation1996).11. Tito Mboweni would later be appointed labour minister and governor of the SARB by Mandela and finance minister by Ramaphosa.12. By 1980, Anglo was the largest foreign investing company in the US, larger than Volkswagen and British Petroleum (Innes Citation1984). The importance of South African big business within the Carter administration’s Cold War plans for the southern African region is discussed in endnote 9.13. Government’s acceptance of the NEF was facilitated by Keys, arguably more comfortable engaging with popular organisations than a regular NP politician. 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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTWe build on and critique previous literature on economic policy configuration during the transition from apartheid to democracy (1990 to 1994) in South Africa (SA). The contribution of this article, and our critique of much influential literature on economic policy formation during the transition, is that the powerful corporate elites were not just stakeholders in negotiations between the apartheid government, the African National Congress (ANC) and other parties. We adopt a structural approach that highlights the crucial role of corporate elites and their active manoeuvring to manage and control economic policymaking during the transition to ensure continuity of the ostensibly free market economic policies they designed during the late-apartheid period. The complicity of the economic leadership of the ANC in squashing progressive economic transformation horizons is directly connected to the survival and institutionalisation in the present of late-apartheid neoliberalised economic policy. Ultimately, the corporate elite’s exertion of their state-expanded powers, their co-option of selected members of the black political elite and the ANC’s economic policy self-emasculation has further strengthened multinational corporations’ domination of SA’s markets, which were already highly concentrated, and limited present and future possibilities for inclusive development of the SA economy.KEYWORDS: Apartheidtransitioncorporate eliteseconomic liberalisationdemocratic consolidation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The ANC-commissioned Making Democracy Work (1993) is informed by structuralist and post-Keynesian approaches to economic policy wherein demand and under-full employment are key problems. The growth driver proposed is state-led social and infrastructure investment that crowds im and is followed by private sector investment (Padayachee Citation1998, 438–439).2. Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011) discuss progressive economics, and Padayachee and Fine (Citation2019) details associated policies and for a discussion of progressive macroeconomic policy and its of relevance to South Africa3. The is both a description and an analytical framework for understanding the evolution of SA’s system of accumulation (Fine and Rustomjee Citation1996).4. The term ‘free market’is not about reducing the role of the state. Without laws, policies, security and courts, market freedom is neither possible nor guaranteed (Fine and Saad-Filho Citation2017, 694–695). In the neoliberal frame, the free market entails redirection and transformation of the control and role of the state in social and economic reproduction. Macroecomic policies are aligned to the prescripts of both the Washington and Wall Street Consensus (Hickel Citation2021).5. The GNU ruled from April 1994 to February 1997.6. For a useful summary of the consequences, see Padayachee and Van Niekerk (Citation2019, 230–233).7. Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011) discuss progressive economics, and Padayachee and Fine (Citation2019) details associated policies for of progressive macroeconomic policy and its relevance to SA. For a more general discussion of progressive economics see (Teixeira and Halpin (Citation2011).8. With full control of the NP in the 1970s, P.W. Botha created an ‘imperial presidency’ - no longer accountable to cabinet – that subordinated ‘all sectors of society, public and private alike’ to the national security state paradigm of the securocrats (O’Malley, Citationnd). Botha rationalised state structures, creating numerous cabinet committees, under the command of the new State Security Council. The Council presided over a national security management system, responsible for the co-ordination of ‘all aspects of government policy’ – ‘everything deemed connected to the security of the state now fell under its purview from foreign policy to the price of bread’ ((O’Malley, Citationnd). In late 1977, a secret committee, comprising senior military officials and business leaders, was convened ‘“to understand the other’s needs”’ (Minter Citation1986, 286–287, original emphasis). The thirteen-man Defence Advisory Council later established brought together Afrikaner and English speaking business leader (Minter Citation1986, 287).9. The relationship between the western powers and the elites of SA’s large corporations during the intensification of the Cold War in southern Africa deserves lengthy discussion. The Carlton and Goodhope Conferences institutionalised the partnership between Botha, his securocrats and corporate elites. The corporate elites shared close ties with western governments whom they viewed as key allies in the southern Africa's Cold War. The election of Jimmy Carter to President of the USA (1977 to 1981) provided a boost to SA’s corporate elites. The Carter administration was against escalating sanctions against SA but launched a ‘serious reform initiative’ (Minter Citation1986, 281–282). At this time, the USA’s ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, was in contact with Harry Oppenheimer. They opposed economic sanctions, and publicly declared that businesses acting together could end apartheid (Minter Citation1986, 282; Young, Citation2017: 169–70). In May 1977, Oppenheimer invited Young to address the South African Chamber of Commerce and to reside in his home. After the SA visit, Young met with ‘African leaders’ in Mozambique and secured agreement on the Carter’s administration’s southern African plans to arrest the ‘communist scouge in Africa’ (Young, Citation2017: 171). The positive responses from Oppenheimer and the SA business sector, encouraged President Carter to proceed with their plans. The Carter administration entered into ‘aggressive partnerships’ with the ‘frontline states’ -– -neighbouring countries who provided the ANC military training sites and served as launching pads to infiltrate SA (O’Malley, nd.) – to mediate between business people and freedom fighters (Young, Citation2017: 171). In November 1979, P.W.Botha, at the Carlton Conference, launched the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), an organisation aimed at re-establishing the dominance of the apartheid state and its partners in big business in the southern African region.10. In their management of the transition, the concerns of the business elites of the MEC and finance conglomerates (that controlled most of the economy) extended beyond politically influential ANC leaders. The elites were also uneasy about other wealthy (usually white) South African businesspeople and individuals exploiting opportunities presented by patronage of politically connected individuals. Spicer and his Anglo colleagues worried that opportunistic patronage of the latter type could create negative perceptions, particularly amongst the constituency of the ANC and its allies, that could undermine the strategic long-game of the conglomerates in the relationships they had been nurturing with certain ANC leaders. Spicer, referring to influential ANC and other liberation movement leaders, told Du Toit (2022: 96), “We had people who had nothing, and they’ve got large families, and then they see how others are living who have been here and built up capital, and then they say we should be on that level, and why aren’t we?” Many ANC leaders very quickly developed close relationships with wealthy businesspeople during the transition. For example, Douw Steyn, the insurance and real estate magnate, housed Mandela in his mansion after his divorce from Winnie Mandela in 1990. Steyn later built a villa for Mandela and Graca Machel on his private game reserve. According to Bantu Holomisa, former head of the Transkei Bantustan, Thabo Mbeki’s lavish fiftieth birthday party, in 1992, was sponsored by Sol Kerzner, the casino magnate, who allegedly in exchange wanted assistance to quash his corruption trial in the Transkei (Brummer Citation1996).11. Tito Mboweni would later be appointed labour minister and governor of the SARB by Mandela and finance minister by Ramaphosa.12. By 1980, Anglo was the largest foreign investing company in the US, larger than Volkswagen and British Petroleum (Innes Citation1984). The importance of South African big business within the Carter administration’s Cold War plans for the southern African region is discussed in endnote 9.13. Government’s acceptance of the NEF was facilitated by Keys, arguably more comfortable engaging with popular organisations than a regular NP politician. While tripartism was a landmark the the ‘politics of economic policy formulation’, there was no engagement with policy itself, especially monetary and exchange rate policy’ (Gelb Citation1999, 11).
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南非转型及以后的精英与经济政策
摘要我们以南非(SA)从种族隔离过渡到民主(1990年至1994年)期间的经济政策配置的文献为基础,并对其进行了批判。本文的贡献,以及我们对许多有影响力的关于过渡时期经济政策形成的文献的批判,在于强大的企业精英不仅仅是种族隔离政府、非洲人国民大会(ANC)和其他政党之间谈判的利益相关者。我们采取了一种结构性的方法,强调企业精英的关键作用,以及他们在过渡时期管理和控制经济政策制定方面的积极行动,以确保他们在种族隔离后期设计的表面上的自由市场经济政策的连续性。非国大的经济领导层在压制进步的经济转型视野方面的串通一气,与种族隔离后期新自由主义经济政策的生存和制度化直接相关。最终,企业精英对其国家扩张权力的运用,对黑人政治精英成员的选择以及非国大经济政策的自我阉割,进一步加强了跨国公司对南非市场的统治,这些市场已经高度集中,限制了南非经济包容性发展的现在和未来的可能性。关键词:种族隔离转型、企业精英、经济自由化、民主巩固披露声明作者未发现潜在利益冲突。非国大委托编写的《让民主发挥作用》(1993)采用了结构主义和后凯恩斯主义的经济政策方法,其中需求和就业不足是关键问题。提出的增长动力是国家主导的社会和基础设施投资,这些投资聚集在一起,随后是私营部门投资(Padayachee citation1998,438 - 439)。Teixeira和Halpin (Citation2011)讨论了进步经济学,Padayachee和Fine (Citation2019)详细介绍了相关政策,并讨论了进步宏观经济政策及其与南非的相关性。这既是一种描述,也是一种理解SA积累体系演变的分析框架(Fine and Rustomjee citation, 1996)。“自由市场”一词并不是要减少国家的作用。没有法律、政策、安全和法院,市场自由既不可能也得不到保障(Fine and Saad-Filho Citation2017, 694-695)。在新自由主义框架下,自由市场需要重新定位和转变国家在社会和经济再生产中的控制和作用。宏观经济政策与华盛顿和华尔街共识的规定一致(Hickel Citation2021)。GNU从1994年4月统治到1997年2月。关于结果的有用总结,请参见Padayachee和Van Niekerk (Citation2019, 230-233)。Teixeira和Halpin (Citation2011)讨论了进步经济学,Padayachee和Fine (Citation2019)详细介绍了进步宏观经济政策的相关政策及其与SA的相关性。关于进步经济学的更广泛的讨论见(Teixeira和Halpin (Citation2011))。在20世纪70年代完全控制国民党后,P.W.博塔创造了一个“帝王式总统”——不再对内阁负责——将“社会所有部门,公共部门和私人部门”从属于安全官僚的国家安全国家范式(O ' malley, citationand)。博塔使国家结构合理化,在新成立的国家安全委员会的指挥下建立了许多内阁委员会。该委员会主持国家安全管理系统,负责协调“政府政策的各个方面”——“从外交政策到面包价格,所有被认为与国家安全有关的事情现在都属于它的职权范围”(O ' malley, Citationnd)。1977年末,一个由高级军事官员和商界领袖组成的秘密委员会被召集起来,“以了解对方的需求”(Minter Citation1986, 286-287,原重点)。后来成立的13人国防顾问委员会汇集了南非白人和说英语的商界领袖(Minter Citation1986, 287)。在南部非洲冷战加剧期间,西方列强与南非大企业精英之间的关系值得长时间讨论。卡尔顿会议和古德霍普会议使博塔、他的安全官员和企业精英之间的伙伴关系制度化。企业精英与西方政府关系密切,他们将西方政府视为南部非洲冷战中的关键盟友。吉米·卡特当选美国总统(1977年至1981年)对南非的企业精英们起到了推动作用。卡特政府反对升级对南非的制裁,但发起了“严肃的改革倡议”(Minter Citation1986, 281-282)。 此时,美国驻联合国大使安德鲁·杨正在与哈里·奥本海默接触。他们反对经济制裁,并公开宣称企业联合行动可以结束种族隔离(Minter citation, 1986, 282;杨,引文,2017:169-70)。1977年5月,奥本海默邀请杨在南非商会发表演讲,并住在他的家里。在南非之行之后,杨在莫桑比克会见了“非洲领导人”,并就卡特政府逮捕“非洲共产主义罪犯”的南部非洲计划达成了协议(Young, Citation2017: 171)。奥本海默和南非商界的积极反应鼓励卡特总统继续他们的计划。卡特政府与“前线国家”建立了“积极的伙伴关系”,这些国家为非国大提供军事训练场地,并充当渗透南非的发射台(O ' malley等人),以调解商人和自由战士之间的关系(Young, Citation2017: 171)。1979年11月,p·w·博塔在卡尔顿会议上发起了南部非洲国家联盟(CONSAS),这是一个旨在重建种族隔离国家及其在南部非洲地区大企业伙伴的主导地位的组织。在过渡时期的管理中,MEC的商业精英和金融集团(控制了大部分经济)的关注点超出了政治上有影响力的非国大领导人。精英们也对其他富有的(通常是白人)南非商人和个人利用有政治关系的人提供的机会感到不安。斯派塞和他的盎格鲁同事担心,后一种类型的机会主义赞助可能会造成负面印象,特别是在非洲人国民大会及其盟友的选区中,这可能会破坏大企业集团与某些非洲人国民大会领导人建立的关系中的战略长期博弈。斯派塞指的是有影响力的非国大和其他解放运动领导人,他告诉杜·托伊特(2022:96),“我们有一些一无所有的人,他们有大家庭,然后他们看到其他人在这里生活并建立了资本,然后他们说我们应该达到那个水平,为什么我们没有?”在过渡时期,许多非国大领导人很快与富有的商人建立了密切的关系。例如,1990年曼德拉与温妮·曼德拉(Winnie Mandela)离婚后,保险和房地产大亨道·斯泰恩(dow Steyn)将曼德拉安置在自己的豪宅里。斯泰恩后来在他的私人野生动物保护区为曼德拉和格拉萨·马谢尔建造了一座别墅。根据特兰斯凯班图斯坦的前首领班图·霍罗米萨的说法,1992年塔博·姆贝基的奢华的五十岁生日派对是由赌场大亨索尔·科兹纳赞助的,据称作为交换,他希望帮助他撤销在特兰斯凯的腐败审判(Brummer Citation1996)。Tito Mboweni后来被曼德拉任命为劳工部长和南非储备银行行长,被拉马福萨任命为财政部长。到1980年,英美资源集团已成为美国最大的外国投资公司,规模超过了大众汽车(Volkswagen)和英国石油公司(British Petroleum)。南非大企业在卡特政府的南部非洲地区冷战计划中的重要性在尾注9.13中讨论。政府接受新经济基金是由基斯促成的,可以说,与普通的国民党政治家相比,基斯更愿意与受欢迎的组织打交道。虽然三方主义是“经济政策制定的政治”的一个里程碑,但没有参与政策本身,特别是货币和汇率政策(Gelb citation1999,11)。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
4.50%
发文量
37
期刊介绍: International Review of Applied Economics is devoted to the practical applications of economic ideas. Applied economics is widely interpreted to embrace empirical work and the application of economics to the evaluation and development of economic policies. The interaction between empirical work and economic policy is an important feature of the journal. The Journal is peer reviewed and international in scope. Articles that draw lessons from the experience of one country for the benefit of others, or that seek to make cross-country comparisons are particularly welcomed. Contributions which discuss policy issues from theoretical positions neglected in other journals are also encouraged.
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