Timely climate proposals. Discourse networks and (dis)continuity in European policies

Abstract

ABSTRACTHow do discursive fields influence support for climate policies? The European Green Deal (EGD) has gained media attention in part because it was presented as a cross-sectorial strategy aiming to ‘transform the European economy’. Our analysis focuses on two specific policy proposals of the EGD: the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the reform for a greener Common Agricultural Policy. By comparing their discourse network structure, we aim to understand policy (dis)continuity introduced with the EGD. We use an original longitudinal dataset and discourse network analysis to map framing dynamics over time and understand how particular frames can gather support in policy networks. Our study shows that two elements favor policy change, namely the resonance of new frames with the discursive field and the presence of brokers connecting previously disconnected actors or coalitions. This paper is relevant for scholars interested in the discursive layer of policy networks as well as (dis)continuity in policy debates.KEYWORDS: Discoursepolicy networksdiscursive fieldframingclimate changeEuropean Green Deal AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback that helped improve and refine our analysis and the paper. We presented previous versions of this paper at the 2022 International Studies Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Environmental Politics and Governance Conference in Pennsylvania, the 2022 American Political Science Association Conference in Montreal, the 2022 Earth System Governance Conference in Toronto, and a seminar of the Canada Research Chair in International Political Economy. We thank the participants and especially Jean-Frédéric Morin for their insightful comments. Finally, we would like to thank the three research assistants who helped with the data collection and coding process: Laurence Bolduc-Landry, Jeanne Desrosiers, and Naomi Laflamme. This work was conducted as part of the Frames in Production: Actors, Networks, Diffusion (FRAMENET), a collaborative research network across research institutions in Germany, Canada and the UK, funded by the Open Research Area (DFG, SSHRC, ESRC).Data availability statementThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, LD, upon reasonable request.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For example, in 2006, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin suggested to implement a carbon border tax. In 2008, the EU adopted a directive providing that from 2012 onwards, the aviation sector would be included in the EU ETS. Therefore, all flights that landed or took off in the EU, regardless of their origin or destination, were subject to the directive (Wu & Salzman, Citation2014). In light of an important push back by some EU trading partners, the EU changed its regulation in order to cover only flights within the European Economic Area arguing that it would allow to ‘support the development of a global measure by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’ (European Commission, Citation2016).2 Although not required as part of the EGD, some Member States (Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Ireland and Italy) have chosen to target livestock in their eco-schemes policies but have been faced with fierce opposition from farmers (see Runge et al., Citation2022).3 Trilogues have become an integral part of legislative procedures in the European Union (see for example Brandsma et al., Citation2021, and other articles in that special issue).4 The ETS is in its fourth phase, while the CAP has undertaken 4 major reforms since 1992 when environmental considerations were first introduced.5 Diagnostic frames refer to ways of framing problem while prognostic frames relate to ways of framing solutions (a distinction initially established by Entman, Citation1993).6 For our two debates, the dataset covers a period from 1997 to 2021, inclusively. This is because this study is part of a larger research project that investigates how specific statements emerge in policy debates, by whom they are proposed, and how they are more broadly diffused into the public arena.7 Betweenness centrality indicates ‘the centrality of an actor is proportional to the degree that the network structure is more connected (or efficient at transmitting information) with the actor present in the network than it would be if the actor were removed from it’ (Patty & Penn, Citation2018, p. 150).8 While ‘Greening the CAP’ is frequently encountered in this policy debate, it is not a novel frame. It is a recurring argument when the debates about the reform of the CAP are resumed and a very consensual frame over time (see Online Appendix B).9 Under Pillar I, MS will fund environmental measures using ‘eco-schemes’ and Pillar II will continue to offer agri-environment-climate payments. MS are now obliged to earmark at least 30% of Pillar II funding for environmental and climate measures (European Commission, Citation2020).10 Direct payments and market measures (Pillar 1) represent 76.8% of agricultural appropriations (European Parliament, Citation2023).11 Other actors resort to employing polarising claims (i.e. claims that provoke agreement or disagreement among actors in the debate, see Figure 17 in the Online Appendix). However, these claims do not garner enough support from various actors to significantly influence the discourse network structure.12 This frame implies an urgent need for action (whether it is the responsibility of a particular sector such as livestock, pesticides, or large farms).13 Conditionality of subsidies, references to the potential of farmlands as carbon sinks or resorting to R&D in the agricultural sector are quite popular and consensual ways of framing the problem.14 It is therefore not surprising that amidst the Ukraine war’s economic necessities, the environmental gains from the reform quickly eroded as food production took priority, leading to derogations from environmental measures (Fortuna & Foote Citation2022).15 For example, in January 2020, the EC president said: ‘a carbon border tax on imports could be necessary, but [she] would instead prefer that the bloc’s global partners match the EU commitments’ (Associated Press International, Citation2020).16 In December 2022, ‘The Heads of State and Government of the G7 decided […] to establish an open and cooperative international Climate Club. The G7 invites interested states that pursue an ambitious climate policy to join the Climate Club […]’ (G7, Citation2022).17 While the idea of a CBAM was supported by Industry Commissioner Verheugen in 2006, Trade Commissioner Mandelson publicly opposed the idea (see Euractiv, Citation2006).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Fonds de Recherche du Québec-Société et Culture; Open Research Area (DFG, SSHRC, ESRC); Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.Notes on contributorsLaurie DurelLaurie Durel is a PhD Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Université Laval.Laure GosselinLaure Gosselin is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Political Science, Université Laval and Technische Universität Dresden.