First Price Auction is 1 − 1/ e ² Efficient

IF 2.3 2区计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE Journal of the ACM Pub Date : 2023-10-14 DOI:10.1145/3617902

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1-1/ e 2 ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

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首价拍卖是1−1/ e 2有效

我们证明了首价拍卖的PoA为1-1/ e 2≈0.8647，缩小了已知边界[0.7430,0.8689]之间的差距。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of the ACM 工程技术-计算机：理论方法

CiteScore

7.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

3 months

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First Price Auction is 1 − 1/ e 2 Efficient

Abstract

First Price Auction is 1 − 1/ e ² Efficient