Causal decision theory, context, and determinism

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI:10.1111/phpr.13021
Calum McNamara
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Abstract

Abstract The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice you make—were different in the present, either the laws would be violated or the distant past would be changed. And as several authors have shown, it's easy to transform this upshot of the standard theory of counterfactuals into full‐blown counterexamples to CDT. In response to these counterexamples, I argue here that the problem lies, not so much with CDT's guiding idea—that it's the expected causal consequences of your actions that matter for rational decision‐making—but with the fact that the classic formulation of CDT doesn't pay sufficient attention to the context‐sensitivity of counterfactuals. I develop a contextualist version of CDT which better accounts for this context‐sensitivity. And I show that my theory avoids the problems faced by the classic formulation of CDT in determinstic worlds.
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因果决策理论,语境和决定论
因果决策理论(CDT)的经典表述诉诸于反事实。它说你应该选择一个会有好结果的选项,如果你选择了它。然而,如果自然法则是确定的,这个版本的CDT就会遇到麻烦。毕竟,反事实的标准理论认为,如果定律是确定性的,那么如果任何事情——包括你所做的选择——在现在是不同的,要么定律会被违反,要么遥远的过去会被改变。正如几位作者所表明的那样,很容易将反事实标准理论的结论转化为CDT的完整反例。作为对这些反例的回应,我认为问题不在于CDT的指导思想——你的行为的预期因果结果对理性决策很重要——而在于CDT的经典公式没有充分注意到反事实的上下文敏感性。我开发了一个上下文主义版本的CDT,它更好地解释了这种上下文敏感性。我证明了我的理论避免了经典CDT公式在确定性世界中所面临的问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
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