AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REFERRALS

IF 1.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS International Economic Review Pub Date : 2023-10-14 DOI:10.1111/iere.12671
Youze Lang, Youzhi Yang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

About 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive-compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A nondegenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.

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有内部和外部推荐的均衡劳动力市场模型
大约 40% 的工人是通过推荐找到工作的。我们根据推荐人是否在招聘公司工作(内部推荐)(外部推荐)来区分两类推荐。有趣的是,通过内部(外部)推荐找到的工作比通过正规途径找到的工作薪酬更高(更低)。然后,通过引入一种激励兼容的机制,工人可以分享职位空缺信息,从而建立一个均衡的劳动力市场模型。在均衡状态下,会出现非生成的工资分布,内部(外部)推荐会带来工资溢价(惩罚)。经过校准,我们的模型可以捕捉到美国劳动力市场的这些显著特征。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
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0
期刊介绍: The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.
期刊最新文献
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