Jizhou Wang, Jin’an He, Richard Cebula, Maggie Foley, Fangping Peng
{"title":"Mixed ownership reform, political connections, and overinvestment","authors":"Jizhou Wang, Jin’an He, Richard Cebula, Maggie Foley, Fangping Peng","doi":"10.1111/ajes.12549","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The study discovers that mixed ownership reform aimed at enhancing the performance and resource allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises may have unintended consequences in China. When the nature of state-owned control remains unchanged, there is a risk of increased overinvestment due to misaligned interests between state-owned equity representatives and companies. This incentive can be mitigated by introducing nonstate shareholders with political connections. The study employs a double machine learning method to analyze data from state-owned listed companies that introduced nonstate shareholders through stock issuance between 2008 and 2019. The research underscores that modern corporate governance mechanisms are crucial for successful mixed ownership reform.</p>","PeriodicalId":47133,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Economics and Sociology","volume":"83 2","pages":"407-425"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Journal of Economics and Sociology","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajes.12549","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The study discovers that mixed ownership reform aimed at enhancing the performance and resource allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises may have unintended consequences in China. When the nature of state-owned control remains unchanged, there is a risk of increased overinvestment due to misaligned interests between state-owned equity representatives and companies. This incentive can be mitigated by introducing nonstate shareholders with political connections. The study employs a double machine learning method to analyze data from state-owned listed companies that introduced nonstate shareholders through stock issuance between 2008 and 2019. The research underscores that modern corporate governance mechanisms are crucial for successful mixed ownership reform.
期刊介绍:
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (AJES) was founded in 1941, with support from the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, to encourage the development of transdisciplinary solutions to social problems. In the introduction to the first issue, John Dewey observed that “the hostile state of the world and the intellectual division that has been built up in so-called ‘social science,’ are … reflections and expressions of the same fundamental causes.” Dewey commended this journal for its intention to promote “synthesis in the social field.” Dewey wrote those words almost six decades after the social science associations split off from the American Historical Association in pursuit of value-free knowledge derived from specialized disciplines. Since he wrote them, academic or disciplinary specialization has become even more pronounced. Multi-disciplinary work is superficially extolled in major universities, but practices and incentives still favor highly specialized work. The result is that academia has become a bastion of analytic excellence, breaking phenomena into components for intensive investigation, but it contributes little synthetic or holistic understanding that can aid society in finding solutions to contemporary problems. Analytic work remains important, but in response to the current lop-sided emphasis on specialization, the board of AJES has decided to return to its roots by emphasizing a more integrated and practical approach to knowledge.