Repenetrating the Rural Periphery: Party Building Under China’s Anti-Poverty Campaign

Abstract

ABSTRACTPost-Mao reforms ranging from de-collectivization to the abolition of agricultural taxes have eroded the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the rural periphery. However, with an agenda to strengthen the CCP’s all-around control over the economy and society, the Xi Jinping era saw a reversal of the long-term trend. We argue that Xi’s high-profile anti-poverty campaign from 2015 to 2020 consisted of massive Party building attempts and served as an important strategy for the Party to repenetrate the rural periphery. Based on in-depth fieldwork, archival research, and secondary information sources, we show that by injecting human and financial resources into poverty regions, the CCP reinvigorated its previously underfunded and demoralized grassroots organs, expanded rural Party member recruitment, and enhanced the Party’s intervention in village affairs. Therefore, despite its seemingly economic nature, Xi’s anti-poverty campaign may lead to the long-lasting effect of Party power consolidation in the countryside. This finding suggests that authoritarian regimes can use campaigns with appealing policy goals to advance broader political agendas and enhance authoritarian resilience.KEYWORDS: CampaignChinaParty buildingsent-down cadrestargeted poverty alleviation Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Victor Nee, ‘A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism’, American Sociological Review 54(5), (1989), pp. 663–681; Feng Chen and Ting Gong, ‘Party versus Market in Post‐Mao China: The Erosion of the Leninist Organization from Below’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 13(3), (1997), pp. 148–166; Andrew J. Nathan, ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14(1), (2003), pp. 6–17.2 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (University of California Press 2008); Daniel Koss, ‘Party Building as Institutional Bricolage: Asserting Authority at the Business Frontier’, The China Quarterly 248, (2021), pp. 1–22.3 Patricia M. Thornton, ‘The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?’, The China Quarterly 213, (2013), pp. 1–18; Xiaojun Yan and Jie Huang, ‘Navigating Unknown Waters: The Chinese Communist Party’s New Presence in the Private Sector’, The China Review 17(2), (2017), pp. 37–63.4 Yansui Liu et al., ‘The Process and Driving Forces of Rural Hollowing in China under Rapid Urbanization’, Journal of Geographical Sciences 20(6), (2010), pp. 876–888.5 The field research sites were not randomly sampled. We selected these poverty areas in coastal and inland areas with varying degrees of development and yet under the same pressure of rural poverty reduction, where we could closely observe the TPA campaign and access candid and reliable interviewees. Although most of the interviews mentioned in the empirical analysis were from Shandong Province, the phenomena discussed were observed across the different localities, which suggests that they are representative of the general situation in poverty villages across China.6 Nathan (n 1).7 Minxin Pei, ‘China’s Governance Crisis’, Foreign Affairs 81(5), (2002), pp. 96–109.8 Thornton (n 3).9 Bruce J. Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival (Oxford University Press, 2016).10 Cheng Li, ‘The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38(3), (2009), pp. 13–33; Charlotte P. 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Strauss, State Formation in China and Taiwan: Bureaucracy, Campaign, and Performance (Cambridge University Press, 2020); Cai Zuo, Zhongyuan Wang and Qingjie Zeng, ‘From Poverty to Trust: Political Implications of the Anti-Poverty Campaign in China’, International Political Science Review (2021) (June), pp. 1–22.28 Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘Missionaries of the Party: Work-Team Participation and Intellectual Incorporation’, The China Quarterly 248, (2021), p. 73.29 Kenneth Jowitt, ‘Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes’, World Politics 28(1), (1975), p. 95.30 Melanie Manion, Corruption by design: Building clean government in mainland China and Hong Kong (Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 198.31 White (n 26); Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: “Constructing a New Socialist Countryside”’ in Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Harvard University Asia Center 2011); Kristen E. Looney, Mobilizing for Development: the Modernization of Rural East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2020), pp. 50–51.32 Looney (n31) 51.33 Julia C. Strauss, ‘Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1953’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 44(1), (2002), pp. 80–105; Julia C. Strauss, ‘Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation and after, 1949–1956’, The China Quarterly 188, (2006), pp. 891–912.34 Benjamin Van Rooij, ‘The Campaign Enforcement Style: Chinese Practice in Context and Comparison’ in Francesca Bignami and David Zaring (eds) Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global Regulatory Process (Edward Elgar, 2016), p. 219.35 Jing Vivian Zhan and Jiangnan Zhu, ‘Policy Coordination and Selective Corruption Control in China’, Policy Studies Journal 51(3), (2023), pp. 685–702.36 Christopher Carothers and Zhu Zhang, ‘From Corruption Control to Everything Control: The Widening Use of Inspections in Xi’s China’, Journal of Contemporary China 32(140), (2023), pp. 225–242.37 CCP Central Committee and State Council, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu dayin tuopin gongjian zhan de jueding’ [The Central Decision on Winning the War on Poverty] (Gov.cn, November 29, 2015), accessed June 2, 2021, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2015/content_2978250.htm.38 Xi Jinping, ‘Zai quanguo tuopin gongjian zongjie biaozhang dahui shang de jianghua’ [Speech at the Conclusion and Award Meeting of the National War on Poverty] (Xinhua Net, 25 February 2021), accessed March 4, 2022, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-02/25/c_1127140240.htm.39 ‘22 Ge tuopin renwu zhong de shengqushi xiang zhongyang qianding zerenshu’ [22 Provinces with Urgent Tasks of Poverty Elimination Signed Statements of Responsibility with the Central Government] (Nrra.gov.cn, November 29, 2015), accessed 13 February 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2015/11/29/art_624_41985.html.40 See ‘The Central Decision on Winning the War on Poverty’ (2015).41 ibid.42 The National Bureau of Rural Revitalization, previously known as the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, provided reports on its official website (http://www.nrra.gov.cn/) about rotating sent-down cadres among villages during and after the TPA campaign. On the practice of sending down cadres and work teams under the TPA campaign, also see Perry (n 28); Zuo, Wang, and Zeng (n 27).43 See ‘The Central Decision on Winning the War on Poverty’ (2015).44 General Office of the CCP Central Committee and General Office of the State Council, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang pinkuncun zhucun gongzuodui xuanpai guanli gongzuo de zhidao yijian’ [Guiding Opinions on the Dispatchment and Management of Work Teams to Poverty Villages] (Gov.cn, December 24, 2017), accessed June 4, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2018/content_5257369.htm.45 Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘Making Communism Work: Sinicizing a Soviet Governance Practice’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 61(3), (2019), pp. 535–562; Govind S. Kelkar, ‘The Chinese Experience of Political Campaigns and Mass Mobilization’, Social Scientist 7(5), (1978), pp. 45–63.46 ‘51.8 wanming zhucun diyi shuji fendou zaiyixian’ [518,000 First Secretaries Worked Hard at the Frontline]’ (Xczx.wuhan.gov.cn, August 13, 2021), accessed February 13, 2023, http://xczx.wuhan.gov.cn/bmdt_56/gzdt/shfp/202108/t20210815_1759281.shtml.47 Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, Central Leading Group Office of Rural Work and the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, ‘Guanyu zuohao xuanpai jiguan youxiu ganbu daocun ren diyi shuji de tongzhi’ [The Notification of the Appointment of Outstanding Cadres as First Party Secretaries in Villages] (Nrra.gov.cn, 13 May 2015), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2015/5/13/art_50_13584.html.48 ‘Guangdong Yunfu xinpai diyi shuji zhongdiancun quanfugai’ [First Secretaries Dispatched to the Key Villages of Yunfu, Guangdong] (Xcgbb.com, October 22, 2021), accessed January 21, 2022, http://www.xcgbb.com/zxts/202110/t20211022_7279735.shtml.49 ‘Wosheng juban zhongshengzhi danwei zhucun diyi shuji jizhong peixun shifanban’ [Training Classes Provided to the First Secretaries Dispatched from Central and Provincial Units] (Mdj.gov.cn, October 29, 2021), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.mdj.gov.cn/shizheng/snxw/202110/t20211029_327321.html.50 ‘Guizhou sheng nizhao qianming xiangzhen gongwuyuan’ [The Notification of Recruiting Township Civil Servants from the Village Cadres, the College Students Working as Village Officials, the First Secretaries and Other Sent-down Cadres with Outstanding Performance in Anti-poverty Work] (Xinhua Net, 26 July 2019), accessed September 12, 2023, http://m.xinhuanet.com/gz/2019–07/26/c_1124801700.htm.51 See, accessed February 13, 2023, http://xczx.wuhan.gov.cn/bmdt_56/gzdt/shfp/202108/t20210815_1759281.shtml.52 See ‘The Notification of the Appointment of Outstanding Cadres as First Party Secretaries in Villages’ (2015).53 Interview with a village first secretary (Shandong, August 16, 2017).54 Interview with an official in a county-level poverty alleviation office (Jiangsu, February 14, 2017).55 Interviews with two village first secretaries (Shandong, August 15, 2017).56 ‘Hunan: qi cha gongjian lu’ [Hunan: Party Building in Poverty Alleviation] (Nrra.gov.cn, 15 November 2018), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2018/11/15/art_5_91205.html.57 Interviews with two village first secretaries (Shandong, August 15, 2017).58 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, September 30, 2022).59 Interview with a villager (Hubei, January 11, 2018).60 Interview with a village first secretary (Shandong, August 15, 2017).61 During the TPA campaign, the State Council dispatched cross-provincial third-party evaluation teams (disanfang pingguzu 第三方评估组) that presumably had no stakes in the localities being evaluated to provide impartial evaluations of poverty alleviation performance. The authors joined the Nanchang University Third-Party Evaluation Team and visited Hubei in January 2018. The 124 poverty households were randomly selected from six administrative villages in one county through stratified sampling. The Evaluation Team physically visited these households to conduct face-to-face interviews. The questions presented in Table 1 were part of the survey questionnaire used by the Evaluation Team.62 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, September 30, 2022).63 ibid.64 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, September 30, 2022).65 See ‘Shandong sheng weisheng he jihua shengyu weiyuanhui dierlun diyi shuji jianbao’ [A Brief Report of the Work by the Second Group of First Secretaries Dispatched by the Health and Family Planning Commission of Shandong] (Wsjkw.shandong.gov.cn, 16 January 2017), accessed February 13, 2023, http://wsjkw.shandong.gov.cn/ztzl/wqhg/dysj/xgxw/201701/t20170120_3426037.html; ‘Shandong: diyi shuji jincun lai’ [Shandong: First Secretaries Came to the Villages] (Nrra.gov.cn, 24 August 2017), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2017/8/24/art_5_68143.html.66 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, September 30, 2022).67 Rongchang Zhang (ed), Cao County Yearbook (Unity Press, 2019), p. 342.68 Zhengjie Shi (ed), Kang County Yearbook (Tianjin Press for Classic Books, 2019), p. 94.69 We focus on Xinjiang because it is the only province that routinely disclosed systematic statistics on Party membership across population groups and because it represents the less developed rural regions.70 Hillman (n 20).71 Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee and Ministry of Civil Affairs, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshe zhuoli zhengzhi cunba wenti de tongzhi’ [Notification of Building Rural Primary-level Organizations and Rectifying Village Despots] (12371.cn, 7 March 2017), accessed June 10, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2021/01/05/ARTI1609834755963759.shtml.72 General Office of the CCP Central Committee and General Office of the State Council, ‘Guanyu jianli jianquan cunwu jiandu weiyuanhui de zhidao yijian’ [Guiding Opinions on Establishing Village Affair Supervision Committees] (Gov.cn, December 4, 2017), accessed June 8, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-12/04/content_5244406.htm.73 ‘Zhongyang jiwei kaizhan fupin lingyu fubai he zuofeng wenti zhuanxiang zhengzhi’ [The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Decided to Launch a Special Campaign against Corruption and Misconduct in Poverty Alleviation] (Nrra.gov.cn, December 19, 2017), accessed 14 July 2022, http://nrra.gov.cn/art/2017/12/19/art_2082_75237.html.74 ‘Weiji weigui baoguang pingtai’ [Party Discipline Violation Report Platform] (nrra.gov.cn, 2017–2021), accessed October 14, 2021, http://nrra.gov.cn/col/col2081/index.html.75 General Office of the CCP Central Committee, ‘Guanyu dang de jiceng zuzhi renqi de yijian’ [Opinions on the Term of Office for the Primary-level Party Organizations] (Gov.cn, July 12, 2018), accessed June 8, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-07/12/content_5305944.htm.76 CCP Central Committee, ‘Zhongguo gongchandang nongcun jiceng zuzhi gongzuo tiaoli’ [Regulations on the Work of Rural Primary-level Party Organizations] (Gov.cn, January 10, 2019), accessed June 8, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-01/10/content_5356764.htm.77 See ‘Guiding Opinions on the Dispatchment and Management of Work Teams to Poverty Villages’ (2017).78 ‘Diyi shuji Qi Jianqiang: Shangfang cunli ba lengle de xin luanre’ [First Secretary Qi Jianqiang: Warming the cold hearts in a petitioning village] (CCP News Net, September 26, 2016), accessed 13 January, 2023, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0926/c117092-28739907.html.79 Guoshen Chen and Jinghua Tang, ‘Diyi Shuji “Lingdao” Xia de Cunzhuang Huanjie Xuanju—Jiyu Guangxi H Cun Diqijie Liangwei Huanjie Xuanju Gongzuo de Diaoyan’ [Village Elections under the Leadership of First Secretary: A Study of the 7th Elections of the Two Village Committees in Village H from Guangxi Province], People’s Congress Studying 10, (2016), p. 32.80 ‘Hebei sheng julu xian dongxinzhuangcun jiakuai jingzhun fupin’ [Dongxinzhuang Village of Julu County from Hebei Province Accelerated Targeted Poverty Alleviation] (Nrra.gov.cn, April 11, 2016), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2016/4/11/art_5_48163.html.81 ‘Anhui: fupin da zoufang tuopin you diqi’ [Anhui: The Cadres’ Massive Visit to Villagers Consolidated the Foundation of Poverty Reduction] (Nrra.gov.cn, 26 November 2018) http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2018/11/26/art_5_91361.html ‘Liaoning Panjin 128 ming ganbu zhucun ruhu fupin’ [128 Cadres were Sent Down to Villages for Poverty Alleviation in Panjin, Liaoning] (Nrra.gov.cn, 8 September 2015), Both accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2015/9/8/art_5_22010.html.82 ‘Anhui Suzhou: ai zhege difang buxuyao liyou’ [Suzhou, Anhui: It Requires No Reason to Love this Place] (Nrra.gov.cn, 29 July 2019), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2019/7/29/art_5_100942.html.83 See, accessed January 13, 2023, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0926/c117092-28739907.html.84 ‘Shaanxi Pingli: cuncun youge zongduizhang’ [Pingli, Shaanxi: Every Village is Equipped with A Team Leader] (Nrra.gov.cn, July 9, 2019), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2019/7/9/art_5_99829.html.85 See, accessed March 4, 2022, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-02/25/c_1127140240.htm.86 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, July 1, 2019).87 Interview with a former village first secretary (Shandong, September 30, 2022).88 General Office of the CCP Central Committee, ‘Guanyu xiang zhongdian xiangcun chixu paizhu diyi shuji he gongzuodui de yijian’ [The Suggestions of Continuously Sending Down First Secretaries and Work Teams to the Villages of Importance for Rural Revitalization] (Gov.cn, 11 May 2021), accessed 2 June 2021, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021–05/11/content_5605841.htm.89 ‘Hu’nan 2.4 wanyuming zhucun ganbu jiexu fenzhan xiangcun zhenxing’ [More than 24 Thousand Sent-down Cadres are Ready to Continue the Work of Rural Revitalization] (Nrra.gov.cn, 2 June 2021), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2021/6/2/art_38_189794.html.90 ‘Chongqing dazao shengjiban zhucun bangfu duiwu’ [Chongqing Municipality Upgraded the Work Teams] (Nrra.gov.cn, 20 April 2021), accessed February 13, 2023, http://www.nrra.gov.cn/art/2021/4/20/art_38_188463.html.91 Yan (n 24).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China [19BGL204]; Hong Kong Research Grants Council [14600722]; Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation, Chinese Ministry of Education [22YJC810014]; Philosophy and Social Sciences General Foundation, Jiangsu Education Department [2022SJYB0294].Notes on contributorsHaoyue ZhouHaoyue Zhou is an assistant professor in the School of Public Administration and a researcher in Jiangsu Institute of Social Security at Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. Her research focuses on Chinese politics, campaign-style governance and rural development.Jing Vivian ZhanJing Vivian Zhan is a professor in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. She specializes in comparative politics and methodology, with a focus on the political economy, intergovernmental relations and local governance of contemporary China.