The African novel and the question of communalism in African philosophy

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.AcknowledgmentI wish to thank Migdalia Arcila Valenzuela and Christopher J. Lee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.Notes1 Jackson uses the term “philosophical thinking” explicitly in her book, see Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 185. She also uses the term “philosophical practice”, see Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 20. Jackson appears to be using these two terms as synonyms, and I will be following her in this practice.2 Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 22.3 Ibid., 116.4 Ibid, 125.5 Ibid, 134.6 Ibid, 121.7 Polycarp Ikuenobe, “Tradition and the Foundation for African Renaissance.”8 In the sense that these debates are centered around how we ought to live, they thus invoke a standard of goodness or rightness.9 Thaddeus Metz, “Toward an African Moral Theory.”10 Táíwò, “Against African Communalism.”11 Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 50.12 Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe, 9.13 Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 71–3.14 Ibid, 156.15 Polycarp Ikuenobe, “The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart.”16 Horton, Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold Coast, 167.17 Mazrui, “Africa, My Conscience, and I.” Also Táíwò, “Obafemi Awolowo: Knowledge, Leadership, Governance,” 64.18 See, for example, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa, 46; Imafidon, “Alterity, African Modernity, and the Critique of Change,” 14.19 Jackson, The African Novel of Ideas, 80.20 Táíwò, Against Decolonisation, 164–5.21 A similar point was also made by Wiredu, “Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion,” 295–6.22 See, for example, the misplaced critique of Samir Amin in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa, 11. This critique ultimately stems from an overly broad conception of decolonization. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s conception of decolonization draws upon the notion of decoloniality as articulated by Walter Mignolo.23 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” 17.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by a doctoral fellowship provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.Notes on contributorsZeyad El NabolsyZeyad El Nabolsy is an assistant professor of philosophy at York University. His work focuses on the history of African philosophy broadly conceived. His work has previously appeared in The Journal of African Cultural Studies, Kant Studies Online, Journal of Historical Sociology, and Science & Society.