Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation

IF 5.6 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS American Economic Journal-Economic Policy Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI:10.1257/pol.20210155
Eric Ohrn
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Abstract

I analyze the effect of two corporate tax breaks, bonus depreciation and the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), on executive compensation in publicly traded US firms. I find both tax breaks significantly increase executive compensation. For every dollar a firm benefits from the tax breaks, compensation of the firm’s top five highest-paid executives increases by $0.17 to $0.25. The tax breaks increase compensation primarily in firms with weaker governance structures, suggesting the compensation response is driven by executive rent extraction. (JEL D22, G34, H25, M12, M52)
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企业税收减免和高管薪酬
我分析了两种公司税收减免——奖金折旧和国内生产活动扣除(DPAD)——对美国上市公司高管薪酬的影响。我发现这两项税收减免都显著提高了高管薪酬。公司每从税收减免中获益1美元,该公司收入最高的5位高管的薪酬就会增加0.17美元至0.25美元。税收减免主要增加了治理结构较弱的公司的薪酬,这表明薪酬反应是由高管租金提取驱动的。(凝胶d22, g34, h25, m12, m52)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.20
自引率
1.90%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) is a general-interest economics journal. The journal publishes 12 issues containing articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in economics. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy publishes papers covering a range of topics, the common theme being the role of economic policy in economic outcomes. Subject areas include public economics; urban and regional economics; public policy aspects of health, education, welfare and political institutions; law and economics; economic regulation; and environmental and natural resource economics.
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